Neville Chamberlain and World War Two

Did Neville Chamberlain’s appeasement of Germany change the outcome of the war?

Did delaying the war by at least 12 months allow the Allies a chance to prepare for the war?

Where German forces superior to Soviets, American, British, Canadian forces?

Had German invaded Russia before France would the war have ended differently?

Yes. I think had the German Reich Invaded Stalinist Russia the war woukld have ended much different. The west would not have intervened on behalf of Stalinist Russia after having intervened in its attempted overthrow before being vanquished by Leon Trotsky's red army. Though the superior planned economy and the strategic move of heavy industry east may have allowed for an effective halt at the Urals and perpetual guerilla war agaist fascism in the east.

Chamberlain was the ultimate appeaser who referred to the coup plotters in 1938 as "anti-Nazis" who weren't to be trusted. Chamberlain ignored the Oster conspirators calling for outside help to overthrow Hitler while there was still time.

And it didn't matter because after key battles at Leningrad and Stalingrad in 1943, the Red Army began a push to the infernal cauldron to surround General Paulus' army in a crossfire of heavy artillery, and who was ordered by Hitler to fight to the last man. It was hopeless for the Nazis. And it's been said that western leaders at that point feared the Russians would liberate Europe by themselves. The race to Berlin was on.

Truth but unfortunatelty Moscow won and established Degenerated Beuracratic Autocracies throughout eastern Europe. The exceptions being Yugoslavia which was largely built on the backs of Stalins agents in Tito's Communist League. Tito was a bit fo a maveric in the Stalinist Communist International who eventually led his country out of it and into its own Proletarian Bonapartist regime.

Apparently Stalin sent several assassins to murder Tito after the war. Tito was said to have sent a letter to Stalin warning him about tit for tat in kind. I have no idea whether it's true or not.

German Generals devised a plan among themselves to abandon Hitler's Roman battle line tactics. Fuel and supplies were running desperately low, and it was estimated by experienced field commanders that the Russians were placing most of their firepower on front lines, which historians today say was correct. That plan was to take everything the Germans had left and air-drop it behind frontlines into the heart of Russia. Some historians believe this plan would have caught the Russians by surprise and in disarray allowing the Nazis more chance to capture fuel depots, munitions factories which hadn't yet been moved East of the Urals, and eventually major Russian cities. But Hitler denied them, and so we'll never know.

[ 19 October 2008: Message edited by: Fidel ]

Is this the what do we do about the NDP thread?

No reputable Tito biographers have reported that. More to the point, he was extremely lucky to have survived the purges of the late 30's, while he was within the Comintern inside Russia. I have always thought that Tito's dealings with a dominant neighbour (USSR) and his leadership of a federally structured nation are relevent to Canada's ongoing situation. (Ie, sometimes you need to "suck up", and sometimes that will kill you.)

Canada had at least one high level diplomat die mysteriously during the cold war era.

quote:Originally posted by Webgear:
Did Neville Chamberlain’s appeasement of Germany change the outcome of the war?

Did delaying the war by at least 12 months allow the Allies a chance to prepare for the war?

Where German forces superior to Soviets, American, British, Canadian forces?

Had German invaded Russia before France would the war have ended differently?

This is a very difficult equation to resolve. It is filled with so many intangibles.

But I think we can dispose of a few mythologies.

• One) Chamberlain was no mystic peacenick. His decisions based on his view of real-politik necessities not in naive hopes.
• Two) Hitler was not encouraged by the agreement (sell out actually) of Czechoslovakia. Rather the opposite, he was most annoyed that Chamberlain caved in, thus removing the immdediate casus beli for war. Hitler too had to make a popular case for war, and the diplomatic resolution remove it.
• Three) Standing up to Hitler would not have prevented war, it would have just made it immdediate. Hitler had every intention of prosecuting operation Fall Grьn (Case Green -- the invasion plan for Czechoslovakia) and expected the Allies to stand firm, and was suprised by the sell out, and in turn had to stand down his army.

The outcome of the hypothetical situation is very hard to discern, but I will make one comment: I have come to the conclusion that in the historical case a certain amount of bumbling, inter-allied arguement and political insolvency meant that the Allies were somewhat disadvantaged in comparison to the superior competence and commitment of the Wermacht as a fighting organization, and that these factors played a role in the rapid collapse of France in 1940. That said it is by no means true that the Allies were entirely overwhellmed militarily, or that the fall of France was a forgone conclusion. In essence I believe that the German army was aided substantially by a great deal of pure luck in 1940, and without it the campaign might have been protracted even to the extent of the Franco-German war of 1914-18.

Much German success was actually pinned on the direct insubordination of Erwin Rommel and Hienz Guderian, who openly went against the OKH plan and persistently repeated orders, when they made their famous "dash to Channel" coast after the break out at the Ardennes. The acts of insubordinate General's whose devil-dare risk taking pays off, are not the kinds of things one can insert readily into an counter-factual history.

Therefore, to make a fair comparison, in this particular counter-factual historical scenario, one would have make the comparison on the basis that the Germans could expect similar luck in 1938, as they had historically in 1939/40. Making this assumption I think it is just as likely the first years of the war would have been just as catastrophic as they were historically, had the war started a year earlier. The Allies were probably less prepared to fight the war in 1938, than they were in 1939. British rearmament began in earnest immediatly after Munich was signed.

The military hypothesis that France and England could simply have attacked Germany while it was in Czechoslovakia, is the only credible military arguement that supports the thesis that standing firm at Munich and triggering immediate war with Germany might have ended the war early, and to the advantage of the Allies. The problem with this is that this is precisely the scenario that confronted the Allies in September 1939 when Polish refusal to cave in on the issue of the Danzig corridor triggered the historical war. There is no reason to believe that an Allied "stab in the back" would have been any more succesful in 1938 when Germany was invading Czechoslovakia, than it was in 1939 when Germany was invading Poland.

The year grace not only provided breathing room for preperation, but also allowed for a stronger and more committed alliance structure to take shape and also gave time for other diplomatic measure to be taken. The problem of the Belgian, the Japanese and the Russians being most prevalent here. The British for instance used the intervening period to unsuccesfully lobby the Soviet Union, in the hope it could be made neutral in the conflict if not openly opposed to German ambition.

Therefore, in the balance, assuming that the Germans would be just as lucky in 1938, as they were in 1939, Chamberlain decision probably did not alter the overall objective balance between the sides substantially, and therefore the general course of the war that much. As likely as not it helped the Allied cause in the long run, at the expense of Czech independence.

[ 19 October 2008: Message edited by: Cueball ]

quote:Fidel: Apparently Stalin sent several assassins to murder Tito after the war. Tito was said to have sent a letter to Stalin warning him about tit for tat in kind. I have no idea whether it's true or not.

I have a bookmark, in English, of the letter that Tito was supposed to have sent to Stalin. The short letter reads roughly as follows:

quote:Dear Comrade Stalin:

You have sent seven men to assassinate me. If you send any more, then I will send one man to Moscow and there will be no need to send another.

Yours comradely (etc)

J.B. Tito.

quote:Originally posted by N.Beltov:
[QB][/QB]

Maybe it was a bookmark where I'd read it. Treachery!

He saved Russia Draza Mihailovich

quote:Originally posted by enemy_of_capital:
Yes. I think had the German Reich Invaded Stalinist Russia the war woukld have ended much different.

The Western powers were hoping that Hitler would head east first, find more than enough land to satisfy his ambition and destroy Communism in the process. As we know, it didn't work out that way.

Actually nothnig like that at all. They signed the deal with Poland, which is right between Russia and Germany in order to maintain balance. In fact the secret protocols of the agreement the Allies signed with Poland stipulated that the "guarantee" was absolute if Germany invaded Poland. If they really were hoping that Germany would attack the USSR, why would they make such an agreement?

The British interest in Poland has always been to break up the power blocks, niether Russia nor Germany were to have it. That was the main idea.

It is perhaps true that some people (Winston Churchill for example) wished that things would fall out with an alliance between Germany, Poland and the Allies against Russia, but the power dynamics precluded any real support of Germany, despite the fact that Russia was more of an ideological enemy of the UK, than Germany was. France would certainly be opposed.

Letting Germany take up a dominant roll in central Europe was definitely considered to be against British and French interests, regardless of ideological factors.

That is what Versaille was all about.

[ 21 October 2008: Message edited by: Cueball ]

quote:Originally posted by Doug:

The Western powers were hoping that Hitler would head east first, find more than enough land to satisfy his ambition and destroy Communism in the process. As we know, it didn't work out that way.

Yes, and when barbarossa finally did get underway, Roosevelt and Churchill fully expected the Nazis to occupy the Kremlin in about six weeks time. Appeasing Hitler was a strategy used by several leaders, and the west's excuse for not aligning with Stalin was the fact that they knew very little about the state of Russia's readyness for war. There were clues though from JM Keynes and more who were recent visitors that Russia's economy was bustling. The U.S. ambassador to Berlin also reported that Germany's economy was helped along by American captains of industry at a time when America was still recovering from deep economic depression. However, nobody in the west knew the extent of industrialization and steel production in Stalin's Russia.

Lol. But Poland is between Russia and Germany. Why would the British make an Guarantee of Polish independence, which only strictly applied if Germany invaded Poland but NOT if the Soviet Union invaded Poland?

Its very simple, were hedging their bets, thinking that perhaps the USSR would need to invaded poland in order to fight Germany. Britain actively pursued a diplomatic agreement with Russia against Germany after Munich, and was rebuffed by Stalin.

Germany was the immediate threat. And this alignments between Russia, France and UK, against the central European powers led by Germany is historically set in the same framework since the Crimean War.

[ 21 October 2008: Message edited by: Cueball ]

quote:Originally posted by Cueball:

Letting Germany take up a dominant roll in central Europe was definitely considered to be against British and French interests, regardless of ideological factors.

That is what Versaille was all about.

[ 21 October 2008: Message edited by: Cueball ]

And there were the banksters demanding war reparations from the German people. Chamberlain was all for the Hitler project, as were Montagu Norman, Heljmar Schacht, and the banking elite. They forced Germany to print money to make unrealistic reparations. Keynes warned them it would cripple Germany unnecessarily while the warfiteers themselves were unscathed. Edward was keen on Hitler and the Nazis as was Chamberlain, Prescott Bush, George H. Walker, Henry Ford etcetera

That is irrelevant. The banks fund everybody all the time. Whoever is on top gets the money. War is great business there is no doubt. But there is more to it than that.

Chamberlain actively sought an containment agreement with the Soviet Union after Munich and was rebuffed by Stalin. They also signed the protocols with Poland, against German, but not Russia.

If they had seriously wanted an alignment with Germany they would have sought an agreement with Germany and guaranteed Polish independence from attack by the Soviet Union, or ignored the issue of Poland entirely.

What they did was the opposite.

The British agreement with Poland meant that Germany had to declare war on the Allies, if it attacked Poland, the only route that Germany could take to get to Russia -- what were the German supposed to do? Sail up the Baltic and land outside Leningrad.

[ 21 October 2008: Message edited by: Cueball ]

quote:Originally posted by Cueball:
That is irrelevant. The banks fund everybody all the time.

It might be irrelevant to extreme amateur historians like yourself, but Schacht resigned from the Reichbank to orchestrate financial support for the man that he and Bank of England's governor wanted as chancellor. From 1926 on, Schacht secretly supported the NSDAP. And it was said that the Nazis could have invaded Europe without the traitorous appeasment of Chamberlain and Daladier and western democracies standling idly by, but not without help from General Motors, Ford, and German and western financiers.

quote:Chamberlain actively sought an containment agreement with the Soviet Union after Munich and was rebuffed by Stalin.

Chamberlain was irrelevant wrt any real effort to maintain peace. Thousands of human beings were terrorized, murdered and made homeless in England after Chamberlain's bosom friend herr Hitler ordered wave after wave of bombing raids on English cities and industrial base. Canadian Mackenzie King himself described Hitler's eyes as liquid pools of sincerity, or some such. Tommy Douglas wasn't fooled by the paperhanger. My family in England nurtures a deep resentment of all things Conservative, and no respect whatsoever for the bulldog who became fatter and fatter, nor for his hypnagogic oratories which became ever more irrelevant as the war dragged on.

The Germans, French, and Soviets were played against one another, similar to the way Germany, Tzarist Russia, and the Ottoman Empire were before WW I, a "war to end all wars" - a war started when a second rate blue blood was assassinated in what was considered a third rate European city - and the obligatory end result of capitalism in crisis mode.

Britain and France declared war on Germany only after both Germany and the Soviet army invaded Poland - the Poles were effectively abandoned to their own devices by our democratic western leaders. The British used Hoare-Laval and Locarno pacts to encourage the Germans to face the Soviets by neutralizing France and allowing Germany to re-arm for war. Chamberlain's appeasement was a chess move designed to make null and void those states between Germany and the Soviet Union and in creating a common German-Soviet border. The U.S. followed this same general theme after the war with gladio efforts in an attempt to scuttle the Soviets' efforts to create a buffer layer of neutral countries, or ones friendly to Russia, between them and NATO. Charles Gati's published book based on research of U.S. and former Soviet archives revealed this in recent years.

The Soviets and Germans were fully aware of the British-American policy and signed non-aggresion pacts with obvious consideration of the western stance. Only, Hitler and Stalin distrusted one another a great deal, and it's now known that Hitler's ultimate goal was lebenraum of the Soviet Union, Baltics, Balkans, and the war of annihilation against Soviet communism, and German aggression part two. Everyone knew that Hitler had been violating Versailles for years leading up to conflagration. Today, the U.S, uses the same approach and chess maneuvers wrt to Russia, China, India, Iran, and SCO friendlies in general. The U.S. has pursued Keynesian-militarism in a similar way the Nazis did, but on a much larger scale and now ever more the aggressor since the end of cold war.

[ 21 October 2008: Message edited by: Fidel ]

quote:Originally posted by Fidel:


Britain and France declared war on Germany only after both Germany and the Soviet army invaded Poland - the Poles were effectively abandoned to their own devices by our democratic western leaders.

Wrong again. The Allies declared war on Germany on September 3rd 1939 (Canada on the 10th) The Soviet Union invaded Eastern Poland on September 17th 1939. As we can see the British Guarantee was effective only in the German case, not the Soviet one, because the Allies did not likewise declare war on the Soviet Union for invading Poland.

Therefore your theory has no legs, because once Germany Invaded Poland England had no reason to declare war on Germany, if its real aim was to createa common border between Germany and Russia. The Germans and the Russians were arranging this common border all by themselves.

Now I think that in the intervening period after the failure of the "containment" policy, France and England desired that Germany should attack the Soviet Union and not France, and in fact took some measures to actually bring itself into a position where it might war with the Soviet Union as well because Soviets appeared to be acting as tacit allies of Germany. The fact is that they were hedging their bets at that point and refrained from declaring war on the Soviet Union.

But ultimately Hitler had made it eminently clear that France was a main enemy of Germany, and the declaration, directly invited Germany to pursue it claims against France, whereas a policy of neutrality on the Polish question would have been the natural path to follow if the objective was to bring Germany and the Soviet Union to war against each other.

But, in fact Britain actively tried to recruit the Soviet Union as an ally against the emerging power of Germany, all the way through this period, and left the door open by not declaring war on the Soviet Union after it joined Germany in attacking Poland.

It is often said that Allies did less than they might have during the Phoney war, but something here should be noted. Hitler intentionally timed his demands both on Czecholslovakia (Munich) and Poland (Danzig demand) in the late summer/fall. The strategy was based on the idea of making quick work of Poland (or Czechoslovakia) when the weather was good, while at the same time not giving the Western Allies time to prepare a proper assault on the Saar before winter halted operations. After the fall of Poland, the full weight of the Wermacht could then be redeployed to the west during the winter period.

[ 21 October 2008: Message edited by: Cueball ]

quote:Originally posted by Cueball:

Wrong again. The Allies declared war on Germany on September 3rd 1939 (Canada on the 10th) The Soviet Union invaded Eastern Poland on September 17th 1939. As we can see the British Guarantee was effective only in the German case,

As I hinted at before, it was a meaningless declaration of war on Germany after all that had happened before it. Death camp survivors at Kracow said later that they waited and waited, praying in earnest for help from the west. And when that became a lesson in futility, they longed for death and for anyone to bomb Auschwitz and Birkenau into rubble. Recently discovered allied air reconnaissance photos clearly show stacks billowing smoke from crematoria and obvious network of railways leading to Auschwitz from all over Europe indicating the west at least knew the Nazis were quite busy in the area. The killing continued at a frenzied pace until liberation by the Red Army.

Japan had seized Manchuria. Mussolini moved toward armaments and war. Using "foreign aid" to establish control over Albania, and fortified through naval action in 1934. In 1935 he launched a larger military campaign into Ethiopia and Eritrea.

By this time, Nazis were ready to invade Europe itself. In 1935, Hitler took the Saarland through a plebiscite, and formally overriding the Versailles treaty. In 1936, Hitler's army occupied the Rhineland and a Berlin-Rome Axis pact was formed, and then a German-Japanese Pact. Hitler and Mussolini, General Motors, Ford, Studebaker all aided and abetted the overthrow of a democratically-elected leftist government in Spain. Britain's contribution was to make it illegal for workers to travel to Spain to fight fascism during the work week, and so they fought on weekends and back to work on Mondays. Americans were also discouraged from aiding Spanish Republicans. Stalin sent military advisors, tanks, and amunition. It was an important first test for the T-series of Russian tanks.

quote:The timetable accelerated: in 1938, the occupation of Austria in March and of Czechoslovakia in September; in 1939, the swallowing up of more parts of Czechoslovakia and, after conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet Pact in August, the invasion of Poland. At this point, England and France declared war on Germany and World War II began. Japan joined Italy and Germany in a ten-year pact "for the creation of conditions which would promote the prosperity of their peoples." As a signal of its good intentions, Japan began to occupy Indochina as well as China. Germany did even better. By 1941 the Germans had conquered Poland, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France. They had thrown the British army into the sea at Dunkirk and had invaded Rumania, Greece, and Yugoslavia. A new world order seemed to be in the making.

Woodrow Wilson was re-elected in 1916 on a platform to keep America out of war, and five months later asked Congress to bring them into war. "War is a racket" - Smedley D. Butler

quote:But, in fact Britain actively tried to recruit the Soviet Union as an ally against the emerging power of Germany, all the way through this period, and left the door open by [b]not declaring war on the Soviet Union after it joined Germany in attacking Poland.[/b]

In fact - see wikipedia "Soviet invasion of Poland(1939)" - in early 1939, the Soviets tried to form an alliance with U.K., France, Poland, and Romania. But Soviet troops were disallowed transit rights through those countries. Stalin then pursued appeasement with Hitler vis a vis Molotov-Ribbentrop II, a pact which both violated within weeks of signing.

Western leaders official excuses for not pursuing alliance with Soviet Union initially was that none believed the Soviets would make a good military ally against a well-armed Germany considering that Russia was likely still recovering from world war one and "civil war" in the previous decade. In truth, the paperhanger, made chancellor by western financiers, Emil Kirdorf and German industrialists, was single-minded in his plan for lebensraum of Russia and the war of annihilation against Soviet Bolshevism - western aggression against the revolution part two. All the world's a stage.

[ 21 October 2008: Message edited by: Fidel ]

Not at all a meaningless declaration of war. In fact it forced the hand of Germany. Germany had to deal with France and England before doing anything about the SU. What you are missing is that is that Germany deliberately attack Poland in the Fall, in order to forestall an Allied counter-invasion into Western Germany, when the bulk of the Wermacht was in Poland.

Of course by Spring, any operation was equally ridiculous, since the whole Wermacht was on the Rhine, safe in the knowledge that they Eastern Front was secure because of Herr Ribbintrop and Comrade Molotov's scheme.

Obviously the idea of attacking the Ziegfried line in the dead of winter, is the kind of absurd hypothetical scenario that would only occur to people who are so ideologically fixated that they will ignore any facts that don't fit in with their cherrished preconceptions.

[ 21 October 2008: Message edited by: Cueball ]

Remember that the English had a great deal of trade with Germany at that time. Any declaration of war would have been seen as counter productive amongst corporate circles.

What makes no sense to us now is that England was shipping war materials and fuel to Germany well into 1939.

So what? Soviet trade continued with Germany until the day before Germany invaded. This point is irrelevant, these are all linked economies.

You have yet to explain why England and the Allies declared war on Germany when it invaded Poland.

Its very simple, the Allies were opposed both to Germany and the USSR, and did everything they could to prevent either getting the upper hand. Sometimes a cigar is just a cigar.

[ 21 October 2008: Message edited by: Cueball ]

quote:Originally posted by Cueball:
Not at all a meaningless declaration of war. In fact it forced the hand of Germany. Germany had to deal with France and England before doing anything about the SU. What you are missing is that is that Germany deliberately attack Poland in the Fall, in order to forestall an Allied counter-invasion into Western Germany, when the bulk of the Wermacht was in Poland.

Stalin chased the two western leaders around the world for two years and backdoor meetings begging for a second front. Large scale and purposeful allied invasions only happened when tables were turned on the Nazis in key battles at Leningrad and Staligrad. Then did they realize the Soviets could liberate Europe by themselves. Stalin suddenly found himself in charge during a secret meeting at Casablanca where he pounded his fist on the table and shouted, "I want a second front against these bastards!"

Stalin didn't leave the friggin country. What are you on?

quote:Originally posted by Cueball:
Stalin didn't leave the friggin country. What are you on?

Details-details. You must sniff harder, Watson [img]wink.gif" border="0[/img]

It may have been the Tehran Conference My memory is fuzzy. You'll have to do your own legwork on this as I'm somewhat busy.

quote:Originally posted by Toby Fourre:
Remember that the English had a great deal of trade with Germany at that time. Any declaration of war would have been seen as counter productive amongst corporate circles.

Indeed, it's been rumored that members of the British royal family were invested in Nazi Germany. Union Banking operations on Wall Street were shut down by the feds and assets seized for trading with the enemy some time after U.S. forces finally joined the war in Europe by late 1942. Astute comments from Toby.

[ 21 October 2008: Message edited by: Fidel ]

We are not talking about Tehran. We are talking about the treaty system before the war, and wether or not the Allies were trying to engineer wast betweem Germany and the Soviet Union. Stalin didn't leave the country til Tehran. I made the mistake of thinking you were on topic: My bad.

Stalin, did not leave the country to follow any kind of diplomatic offensive regarding an alliance with the UK before Germany attacked Russia. There were negotiations, but these were handled entirely by subordinates, in meetings that Stalin did not attend. Its not as if Stalin went on some highly publicized campaign to forestall German agression before the war.

Interesting, since the topic is Munich, and Chamberlain's so called appeasement, lets not forget that Soviets also had a protection treaty with Czecholsovakia, one which they failed to act on.

Again, none of these theories answer the key question, if the UK intended to foment war between the USSR and Germany, prior to the war, and after Munich, why on earth did they guarantee the indpendence of Poland, and then declare war on Germany on September 3rd 1939, practically forcing Germany to deal with France in 1940?

Or was the fall of France part of the dastardly plot too?

[ 21 October 2008: Message edited by: Cueball ]

quote:Originally posted by Cueball:
Stalin, did not leave the country to follow any kind of diplomatic offensive regarding an alliance with the UK before Germany attacked Russia. There were negotiations, but these were handled entirely by subordinates, in meetings that Stalin did not attend. Its not as if Stalin went on some highly publicized campaign to forestall German agression before the war.

Wiki makes no mention of which Soviet diplomats sought alliance with western leaders in early 1939. I believe either neither or one of Hitler or Stalin attended Molotov-Ribbentrop II, but this particular semi-factoid did not make their phony alliance any more or less legitimate either. "The truth in war is precious", and there are some things which few people were made privy to during official pact signings and secret meetings before and after Hitler was given carte blanche in Europe and start of barbarossa.

A point-oid to remember is that Poland invaded Soviet Ukraine in April 1920, leading to the Polish–Soviet War, which ended with a peace deal in 1921. The truth is that Stalin and Soviets wanted a layer of buffer countries between them and any would-be aggressors in the capitalist west. The U.S. and NATO continued with this theme of forcing the Soviets to maintain lines of defence along the western-eastern frontline states and peretrating gladio terror in buffer countries.

quote:Interesting, since the topic is Munich, and Chamberlain's so called appeasement, lets not forget that Soviets also had a protection treaty with Czecholsovakia, one which they failed to act on.

Czechoslovakia was a windfall prize handed Hitler by Chamberlain and Daladier. Skoda and others were significant manufacturers of munitions and tanks. The shadowy bankers club based in Basel were accused of laundering money for the Nazis and handing Czechoslovakia's gold reserves to Hitler.

quote:Again, none of these theories answer the key question, if the UK intended to foment war between the USSR and Germany, prior to the war, and after Munich, why on earth did they guarantee the indpendence of Poland, and then declare war on Germany

Words that rang hollow for the Poles. German soldiers who were there described Poles as fiersome fighters. Like most of Europe, though, they were not prepared for war let alone Nazi blitzkrieg. Nobody believed Russia could withstand an onslaught from the corporate sponsored military machine. In fact, the Red Army and Russian people stood alone against Nazi Germany for over two years while Hitler poured over two-thirds of the war machine into the heart of Russia. Workers of the world were in awe of the Russian people for their grit and determination.

[ 21 October 2008: Message edited by: Fidel ]

Oh I see the French wanted to be occupied. That was part of the plot.

quote:Originally posted by Cueball:
Oh I see the French wanted to be occupied. That was part of the plot.

The French originally wanted to continue extracting unrealistic war reparations from Germany, even after occupying the Rhine and crippling Germany's industrial base, and along with it the Germans ability to live life while generating money to repay with. British aristocracy also wanted to keep Germany on its heels economically and bleeding them financially. The Americans understood what Keynes and others were saying about crippling Germany unnecessarily, but then later capitulated to the European plan to extract their pound of flesh from ordinary Germans. European socialists called for levying high taxes on warfiteers of WW I as a deterrent to war, but it was decided in secret that the German people would have to pay not German friends of capital and of skull duggery. American industrialists and banksters forged new ties with Germany's elite in a plan to deal themselves in for pieces of British empire and anything else they might scavenge later as players in the great game, Hitler's slave labour colonies included. Daddy Warbucks, a mere comic strip character at first glance, was a clever propaganda tool of the west to introduce and justify the idea of war capitalism. Stalin was convinced at one point that the coming war would be a battle between fascist/capitalist nations of the west for real estate grabs and booty. He wasn't far off even then

[ 21 October 2008: Message edited by: Fidel ]

So that means the point of Munich was to cause the occupation of France?

quote:Originally posted by Cueball:
So that means the point of Munich was to cause the occupation of France?

I think that at times it appeared, and still today, that geopolitical events happen for the best interests of sovereign nations, and in the name of democracy and "free trade." The peace of Westphalia of the 17th century laid out basic tenets for peace between countries experiencing religious conflicts spiralling into bloodbaths. France and Britain were said to have put the muscle on Czechoslovak president Benes to at least agree to the Munich appeasement. Apparently even Hitler wanted it to appear somewhat legitimate, and it may have been in the spirit of Wesphalia. I don't know.

But babblers have tended to agree that the idea of sovereignty of nations has been rode roughshod over even in recent times. It was no different in Europe leading up to war with treachery on all sides. In mid 1944, corporate America was supplying the Nazis with thousand tons of oil, and hundreds tons of much-needed tungsten every month. International Nickel Company was supplied the materials for nickel-plated armour. The oil and illicit drugs and weapons economies still exists today, and they are not black markets in the way ordinary people would think. It was illegal but it happened. What goes on behind the scenes of western world capitalism sometimes is in the better interests of supranationalism. Money is loyal to no sovereign nation.

[ 21 October 2008: Message edited by: Fidel ]

Waxing philospohical about the role of the nation state, does not explain why the Allies declared war on Germany after the invasion of Poland by Germany, but not the USSR when it did the same, if its true intention was too bring the USSR and Germany to war immediatly.

Rather it makes it look like they were doing everything they possibly could to get that bastard Stalin to open a second front.

[ 21 October 2008: Message edited by: Cueball ]

You're at a different level of theorizing the why's than I am. It's just that I can't accept the mechanical, "official" explanations and theories as to what happened. I have nothing left to add. You have interesting questions, Cueball. I can't answer them. Self-interest really can be a strong motivational factor among people. It can make good people do terrible things when other good people stand by and do nothing. And bad people find their own methods. A quote from an old American movie all about treachery and betrayal, Three Days of the Condor:

Joe Turner: Why?
Joubert: I don't interest myself in "why". I think more often in terms of "when", sometimes "where"; always "how much".

quote:Rather it makes it look like they were doing everything they possibly could to get that bastard Stalin to open a second front.

Ha! Good one. But I don't think you believe it.

[ 21 October 2008: Message edited by: Fidel ]

This is not the "official" story. The official story is the Allies guaranteed the independence of Poland for the sake of Democracy, Freedom and the love of the Polish people. This is fiddle-faddle.

The true reason, imo, that Chamberlain entered into a mutual protection pact with Poland was to use Poland as spoiler to ensure that neither the Germans nor the Soviets gained political supremacy in Eastern Europe. As with Versaille, the United Kingdom and France considered Germany, their traditional enemy, to be the most serious competing threat to their interests. They also considered the Soviet Union to be a threat, but when the chips were down, they chose to pursue a policy which relied on Russia as a key ally against the reemerging power of Germany, basically recreating the general terms of the Russian and British alliance that goes back to the end of the Crimean War -- It is based entirely on mutuality of geo-poltical interest, regardless of ideology.

Yes they wanted Germany and Russia to go to war, but not on the premise that Germany could march unhindered into the East and establish a supremely powerful position overaching all other European powers. The result of that proposition would ultimately have been the demise of France, and the establishment of an extremely powerful German superstate, with comparable power to the United States.

This is indeed what happened when Russia won the war against Germany, and the unified Allies were victorious, but it was Russia, not Germany that became superior in Eastern Europe. But Britain wanted neither the Germans nor the Russians to have this strong strategic position, and Poland was the spoiler in the ambitions of both Germany and Russia. It is precisely this concept that resulted in the recreation of Poland as a country by the terms of the Treaty of Versaille.

I can see you are not unaware that Treaty of Versaille was the primary casus beli for the entire European conflict, and the recreation of Poland was central to that treaty. Even in the waning days of the war, at Yalta, Churchill fretted about the Polish question, and tried very hard to get the Americans to stand firm on the Polish issue against Stalin.

quote:Originally posted by Cueball:
This is not the "official" story. The official story is the Allies guaranteed the independence of Poland for the sake of Democracy, Freedom and the love of the Polish people. This is fiddle-faddle.

And Spain? And Czechoslovakia and so on? This Reader's Digest version of events leaves me underwhelmed and unconvinced.

quote:I can see you are not unaware that Treaty of Versaille was the primary casus beli for the entire European conflict, and the recreation of Poland was central to that treaty.

Poland was a sacrificial lamb in the scheme of things. You claim that after failing to stand up for the sovereign integrity of several countries, leaders of western democracy suddenly chose to stand up for Polish sovereignty. That's very generous of you to think so highly of our then leaders of the free world, but I have no reason to believe it.

quote:Even in the waning days of the war, at Yalta, Churchill fretted about the Polish question, and tried very hard to get the Americans to stand firm on the Polish issue against Stalin.

Churchill might have stood arraigned on charges of crimes against humanity for Dresden in a more just version of history, but it never happened that way. He was an aging fascist sympathizer among several who've been exposed for what they were by an historical record.

There was nothing in my statement that suggests that Poland was not a "sacrificial lamb", as you so tediously put it. My point is that looking at pre-WWII Europe through the lens of cold war politics is entirely ridiculous.

At the begining of the war, the world is still a multi-polar world, where the capitalist nation states are in competition with each other, as much as they are in competition with the ideology you are so fond of. In other words not every move orchestrated out of Whitehall was entirely and absolutely focussed on the demise of the Soviet Union.

I have outlined the more complex features of the pre-war european political theater in some detail. Poland was a "dual purpose sacrificial lamb" if you like, which was recreated at Versaille to block both Russian and German hegemony.

And the fact remains, that nothing you have said here in anyway explains why the Allies invited the German attack upon France, and the consequent fall of France by honouring the terms of their mutual protection pact with Poland and declaring war on Germany after Germany attacked Poland.

Anybody with half a brain can see that if they really wanted to get Germany to immediatly march into Russia and destroy Soviet Socialism for purely ideological reasons, then the British would have sold out Poland just as they did Czechoslovakia.

This they did not do. They could easily have just not declared war, and this would have left Germany without any serious quandry about what to do next. Then if your totally abstract join the dots plot were to make any sense Germany would then have been able to attack Russia unhindered by the fact that it was also at war with France and England.

But it was at war with France and England, so if Hitler was to pursue his ambitions of expanding his empire east he was forced to first deal with the Allies on his western front. Hitler, and the entire German high command were entirely agreed on only one aspect of the conduct of the war, and that was that they should do everything in their power to prevent a two front war, like the one that Germany lost in 1914-18.

[ 21 October 2008: Message edited by: Cueball ]

quote:Originally posted by Cueball:
There was nothing in my statement that suggests that Poland was not a sacrificial lamb, as you so tediously put it. My point is that looking at pre-WWII Europe through the lens of cold war politics is entirely ridiculous.

Well I understand that sometimes investigators of phenomenon do examine things in reverse order in pursuit of insight that may or may not be possible by more established methods. The past creates the present.

quote:At the begining of the war, the world is still a multi-polar world, where the capitalist nation states are in competition with each other, as much as they are in competition with the ideology you are so fond of. In other words not every move orchestrated out of Whitehall was entirely and absolutely focussed on the demise of the Soviet Unions.

British imperialism had a long and distinguised history of interest in Russia and Central Asia. It was said that "the sun never sets on the British empire."

The Ottoman Empire was once protected by Britain from Russian, Austrian, and French expansion.

quote:With Bismark gone, the British decided for a war, one in which the Continental powers would crucify each other. Britain calculated she could easily break up the tottering Ottoman empire in order to get Mesopotamia with Kirkuk and its oil under control, to pull the plug on the emerging German oil line to Baghdad and to take Mesopotamia and the oil-rich Middle East including Persia itself. The plan is what became known in history as World War I. It didn’t quite turn out as hoped by London

It was a timultuous time, 19th-20th centuries that saw the end of the Persian empire, Ottoman empire, the end of Russian and British empires. After 70 years down came the Soviet empire. Zbignew Brzezinki referred to it as a grand chess board. Apparently Central Asia is key to controlling Russia and it's vast natural wealth.

quote:And the fact remains, that nothing you have said here in anyway explains why the Allies invited the German attack upon France, and the consequent fall of France by honouring the terms of their mutual protection pact with Poland and declaring war on Germany after Germany attacked Poland.

France's colonies were ripe fruit for picking, although there was a significant army in place. There were Vichy traitors in their midst, and financial-banking interests that went both ways between Germany and France. But you mention honour between nations. In spite of the wars and bloody uprisings and civil wars and empire building that defined Europe's recent past, and the history of bloodsoaked Russia with 25 international armies and mercenaries invading to put a Tsar back on the throne, I must leave this high-minded theme of honour between nations with you and for you to develop in your own mind.

quote:This they did not do. They could easily have just not declared war, and this would have left Germany in a serious quandry about what to do next. Then if your totally abstract join the dots plot were to make any sense Germany would then have been able to attack Russia unhindered by the fact that it was also at war with France and England.

Stalin didn't think Hitler would be so stupid as to repeat the error of WWI, for Germany to wage war on two fronts. As it happened, Stalin was the one begging for a second front. Leningrad and Stalingrad - key battles. Those were two significant events which turned the tables on the Nazis in Russia. In one of those key battles, 50 thousand Red Army soldiers and Jewish partisanis rose up out of the rubble and literally gave their sweat, blood, and tears to turn the tide against a fascist enemy at the gates. There were no high level conferences or deals made to bring them about, just real people fighting against the odds and making it happen.

[ 21 October 2008: Message edited by: Fidel ]

It would be interesting to see the outcome of complete German army fighting against the Russians in 1940/41 if the western front was secured via peace or non aggression agreements.

Had the German 6th Army by passed Stalingrad and carried out eastwards, I think the Soviet army would have before the fall of 1942.

Of course Kursk was a complete mistake for the Germans that the Germans could have not afforded to make.

Not so fast. You are forgetting that prior to 1941 the Russian defensive line was based on series of fortifications arranged aroung the Dnpr/Dvina river lines, not far forward into Beylorussia or the Polish Ukraine. In early 1941, Stalin ordered the Russian army to move forward into hastily prepared positions that were woefully ill prepared to withstand the early assault of the Wermacht in June 1941. A large part of early success of the invasion is a result of this fact.

The Russian army did not even have proper rear area logistics or a withdrawal plan, and in fact destroyed the fortification to their rear, in order to use the material on the new border. Properly prepared, with established airfields, lines of communication, proper logistics, and well developed plans the Dvina/Dnpr line would have been a formidable obstacle.

[ 21 October 2008: Message edited by: Cueball ]

I am not sure, the Germans placed a lot of training into breeching these kinds of defences. I believe their tactics would have been more successful than the initial encounter in Poland and France.

On another note manufacturing arms and armour centres Czechoslovakia and Poland provided much need vehicle support for the German Panzer units. Many captured vehicles were used as anti tank platforms.

Sure. But being able to breach these kinds of defencess, is completely different that catching the best part of the whole Russian army, sitting in the latrine, with its boots off, its pants down and smoking a cigarette.

It took Manstein 7 months to reduce the Sebastapol fort.

[ 21 October 2008: Message edited by: Cueball ]

I agree, the part of the whole Russian army died in a few weeks at the start of the war.

The purge of amry officers in late 1930s did not help the cause either.

I think the purge is a non-factor. Lets remember that the whole idea that the failure of the Russian army was caused by the failure of the front line officers is also a creation of the Stalanist propoganda machine, intended to deflect blame from numerous strategic blunders made by Stalin himself. The common western view is derived in part from the mutually advantageous wartime propoganda produced by western sources, based in the line developed in Moscow. In my view, later, after the war this initial impression that the frontline officers were primarily to blame for the failure was recast in the cold war paradigm in teh west, and the cause identified as the purge.

Looking at outcomes and the reality, we see that those officers largely considered to be essential to Soviet victory, people like Vassilevsky, Rokossovsky, Zhukov, Konev, Timoshenko, Shaposhnikov, Chuikov and the like are all present and in command when the invasion begins. Based on the results, its hard to say that this staff is underqualified to command.

Indeed Zhukov is Chief of Staff, and Zhukov owes his promotion to the purge. I don't see how its possible to quantify the actual impact of the purge either as a negative or a positive.

This argument is usually cast as being about the elimination of experienced officers who were then replaced by less experienced ones. It could easily be charachterized as the wholesale elimination of officers with outmoded ideas being replaced by fresh blood. And this is interesting, because in fact failure in France is usually blamed on the outmoded ideas of the old guard of the French General staff, who were in the way of people like DeGaule getting promotion. On the other hand, failure in 1941 is attributed to the exact opposite.

???

Its very hard to say, but my sense is that the primary causes of failure were actually ones directly to do with the strategic decisions made by Stalin, and the direct interference of the Politburo in the affairs of the army and airforce. Stalin, as I am sure you know, gave direct orders to the front line units not stand by for imminent attack, so as not to provoke a German attack, despite numerous warnings that the Germans were about to invade.

[ 21 October 2008: Message edited by: Cueball ]

That is a great analysis of the effects of the purge Cueball, I agree with you on it; especially with regards to eliminating an out-dated mindset, though a few of those old-guard who rightly should have been purged were left in place to make mistakes in the opening stages of the war, spared by Stalin's whim.

These "what if?" scenarios make me wonder just how much "stuff" is in control of the decision making, rather than the decision makers themselves. Everyone points to Hitler as the "cause" of WWII. I wonder if Hitler didn't matter that much. Maybe the treaty of Versailles dictated some kind of conflict between Germany was inevitable. And we can point back to WWI as the causation for the treaty of Versailles, and so on and so forth, until we are forced to stop at the begining of recorded history.

Not that I'm saying that things are preordained in anyway. You know I don't believe that. But I wonder how much choice there really is, and how much is just dictated by the straightjacket of the past.

quote:Originally posted by Tommy_Paine:

Not that I'm saying that things are preordained in anyway. You know I don't believe that. But I wonder how much choice there really is, and how much is just dictated by the straightjacket of the past.

War seems to be a recurring theme. The majority of people never want war. SOme of us don't doubt the power of multinational corporations to dominate global economies, and I think it's a small step further to believe that they influence governmental policies wrt corporate-friendly trade deals. A number of rich countries have war industries exporting weapons, and energy companies are some of the richest of conservative party support base around the world. Canada has had Washington-style lobbying since Brian Mulroney.

quote:
~U.S. Defense budget is three-quarters of a trillion dollars. Defense industry profits rose 25 percent in one year. When war is that profitable, we're going to see more of it. -- Chalmers Johnson, a long-time cold warrior paraphrased from "Why We Fight" documentary

quote:Originally posted by Cueball:
This argument is usually cast as being about the elimination of experienced officers who were then replaced by less experienced ones

Experienced and battle-hardened German field commanders were rewarded by Hitler with promotions from war duties to desk jobs. I think that in the end there were very many greenhorn officers learning on the job. Hitler not only didn't accept the advice of his own field officers and especially toward the end, they were pulled from frontline duties at times when they were needed most. Stalin cost many lives in the beginning, too, but then decided that technical warfare was best left to the professionals.

[ 22 October 2008: Message edited by: Fidel ]

quote:Originally posted by Tommy_Paine:
These "what if?" scenarios make me wonder just how much "stuff" is in control of the decision making, rather than the decision makers themselves. Everyone points to Hitler as the "cause" of WWII. I wonder if Hitler didn't matter that much. Maybe the treaty of Versailles dictated some kind of conflict between Germany was inevitable. And we can point back to WWI as the causation for the treaty of Versailles, and so on and so forth, until we are forced to stop at the begining of recorded history.

Not that I'm saying that things are preordained in anyway. You know I don't believe that. But I wonder how much choice there really is, and how much is just dictated by the straightjacket of the past.

I agree. I think it is highly likely, even without a meglomaniac leader like Hitler in the drivers seat that Germany would likely have gone to war sometime in the 1940's to reclaim the Danzig corridor and Silesia. Prussia was pretty integral to German state identity.

I think also that with a different leadership, and one less hostile to the Allies that the possibility of a strategic alliance between the Allies and Germany (even a tacit one) would have been far more likely. If Germany had been less ambitious and more cautious things might have been substantially different.

[ 23 October 2008: Message edited by: Cueball ]

These speculations are always interesting although counterfactual history makes great entertainment, it really is difficult to predict a future that didn't happen. World War II is replete with these opportunities. As a historian, I find it harder enough trying to understand what happened and why it happened.

It really is hard to imagine a Germany without Hitler in power from 1933-45. One might be able to build a scenario in which the economy completly collapses and left parties are in the ascendancy. Contrarily, one could see people clinging to the parties of the moderate nationalist right and Versailles being a great rallying point.

quote: War seems to be a recurring theme.

A long time ago, I remember readings something that said historians, or some historians, point to the War of Spanish Succession as the first "world war." That would make the Napoleonic wars the second "world war" and if we view WWI and WWII to be so closely related that they are essentially the same war, then those were the third "world war."

All separated by about a hundred years. Which means we are coming due. Wars don't break out, the peace breaks down, as someone I forget once said.

Being Nerdstroms on the subject here, does it strike anyone as odd that current conflicts always seem (to most) so eloquently and self evidently justified, but the causations for all the wars that have come before seem, well, rather looney?

The CCF told the feds that seniors were in dire straights and needed more money to live in the late 1930's. William Lyon Mackenzie King told them that "money does not grow on trees." The second world war happened. And for this cause, it was as if money grew on trees. Keynes said governments have certain responsibilities to intervene in economies and "prime the pump" when necessary. Canada's government took control of significant powers of money creation to fund the war effort, build new infrastructure and spend on new social programs. Keynesian-militarism in the U.S. took root. Clement Atlee's Labour brought sweeping social reforms in post-war England with Liberal economist William Beveridge advising.

[ 23 October 2008: Message edited by: Fidel ]

quote:Originally posted by Tommy_Paine:

A long time ago, I remember readings something that said historians, or some historians, point to the War of Spanish Succession as the first "world war." That would make the Napoleonic wars the second "world war" and if we view WWI and WWII to be so closely related that they are essentially the same war, then those were the third "world war."

I have heard that Chinese historians view World War I & II as the same war just with a small 20 year ceasefire between the nations.

Does anyone know if this is true?

I personally date WW I as starting in 1912, and ending in 1921, and the begining of WW II as the Marco Polo bridge incident in June 1937.

I can easily see why a Chinese historian might date WW II as starting even earlier than that with the Japanese occupation of Manchuria.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_Wittmann

German SS Hauptsturmführer Michael Wittmann actions during the Battle of Villers-Bocage on June 13 1944 did change the outcome of the opening days of the Normandy invasion .

While in command of a single Panzerkampfwagen VI Tiger he destroyed between 10 and 11 tanks, 2 anti-tank guns and 13 personnel carriers within the space of 15 minutes.

This action delayed the Allies advance into the rest of France by two months according to some military historians. The decision makers may have a plan however the actions of a single man can change the outcome a battle if not a war.

ah, you were watching history chanel this aft', weren't you.   I seem to remember now that a historian presented this idea as "The Great Man" theory of history. (Toynbean?  I'm sure that's the wrong spelling)  He explored just who were the real "Great Men" -- those that actually changed the path of events, as opposed to those who merely reacted, and made "choices" that were actually the only things they could have done at the time.

 It's a source for yet another endless what if history debate.

 As you might remember, I've read a lot of Bernard Cornwell's stuff, and was inspired to look into academic histories on Wellington.  The question I had in my mind was whether Wellington utilized his troops and treated the Spanish populace from a humanist ethic, or a cold practicle ethic.

Nothing in Wellington's make up or character seemed to indicate he was any kind of humanist.  Rather, the conditions he found himself in forced him to put a high priority on reducing casualties, and the lack of resources and long supply lines meant that he had to treat the Spanish populace with the highest regard.  He could not afford to be fighting Spanish guerillas.    It was cold pragmatism.

From my knowledge of Wellington, your statements maybe a correct assessment, my knowledge is more focused on the War of 1812 than European Wars of the era.

I am reading Bernard Cornwell's Vikings series; I have not read his other works. I do have several friends that have meet him.

Apparently the way he describes the Brown Bess being load is not correct.

I rather enjoy the endless threads on history, they are rather interesting compared to some other threads..

Not so fast. While it is the case that individuals naturall cherish those moments where they see themselves as decisively affecting the course of history, history is a lot less maleable than that.

For example, this exceptional circumstance, may indeed, when looked at in the specific have been an example where the act of a single person affected the whole outcome of a series of events, and this is to a certain extent true. But missing from this analysis is role that chance plays, and the every increasing possibility that an act such as the one described, will be countered by a similar act of will and luck that benefit the opposite flow of events.

For example, I read a similar story of heroism about a Marine sargent, whose squad was unable to advance beyond the nest of pillboxes that overlooked Omaha beach. He simply could not get his soldiers to take on the pill boxes, so frunstrated he proceeded to undertake the task himself, in the hopes that his reluctant charges would follow. They did not. But the Germans were so suprised by this singular act of heroism, that he managed to get the soldiers manning three of the emplacements to surrender single handedly, one after the other.

Well, I am sure arguements could be made that this act potentially saved weeks of delay for the Allied invasion.

Also, one Tiger blowing up 10 shitty Shermans, before the Americans and British had discovered that they were not the best tank in the world, is not suprising at all. In the end, the Germans were doomed, anyhow.

So, yeah, one asks what would Europe have been like without Napoleon, and it is a fair question, but one also has to recognize that Revolutionary France had huge potentials not available to the other European powers, not the least of which that it was able to mobilize a huge number of soldiers to the cause of the revolution in the name of the people.

Levee en masse of committed soldiery who envisioned themselves as particpants in the fledgling republic and its cause, was a tool far more available to Napoleon, or any leader of the post revolutionary period, than it was to the Austrians, or Russians monarchs, who relied on the obesiance of their subjects to fill the rolls of their uninspired armies that were often led by incompetent weekend warrior "nobles".

The very fact of the revolution created opportunities that simply would not have been available to a talented artillery officer like Napoleon in the armies of the Czar, whose leadership were almost solely taken from purist of the pure nobility, out of fear of upstarts like Napoleon, who was the son of a mildly affluent attorney, with only a small claim on a noble heritage. The circumstance of the revolution and its ethos created many opportunities that a Napoleon-like figure. At the same time the decadent monarchies of Europe and their hapless armies with their incompetent leadership were not up to the task of defeating ebullient France and its professional military methods... in the short run.

I think Wittman’s case is different; this single tank crew stopped the whole allied advance into eastern France. His actions at the point of the Allied break through in Normandy caused the allies’ time, resources and ceased all forward movement.   

The Allies knew how crappy the Sherman tanks were before Normandy. I believe  Sherman tanks were out matched even north Africa by older German tanks. The only theatre where the allies out matched the Axis tanks was in the Pacific theatre.

I would like comment on Napoleon however I have no knowledge of him or his actions.

Napoleon is essential.

Can you recommend any online reading material?

Oh, half the fun is looking for yourself, Webgear.  I'm sure there's no shortage of Napoleon sites on line.  

Back to Cornwell, I'd be surprised if he made an elementary mistake on something as easily researched as the loading of a musket.  Rather, there may be some confusion between that and the loading of a Baker rifle, or some confusion over the "tap load" method which, I gather, would be dangerous and was only used to get one more quick round off before things turned to the bayonette.

From my memory, Napoleon introduced the idea of organizing armies into corps, where generals on the field would have command of infantry units along with artillery and cavalry and other support units.   The advantages are pretty evident, so I won't go into them.  I'm not sure if Napoleon or the Revolution was responsible for changing the French military system over to one of promotion by merit.  It seemed to have advantages.   While the British system of ensuring an aristocratic officer corps by the purchase of commissions,  I'm not sure one could view the defeat of Napoleon as a vindication of the latter.  I'm sure the French military officer corps was still dominated by aristocrats, and at the same time Wellington was memorable because he was one of the few idiots in the British officer ranks. 

Favorite Wellington quote: (as he looked down the list of the general staff supplied by White Hall)  "I can only hope these names fill the French with as much fear as it does me."

 I think a more interesting way to look at the period isn't so much to focus on Napoleon, Blucher or Wellington, but to look at the existing conditions in each nation and how that influenced the way each military organized itself, and how it related to strategy and tactics.

Yes well the Corps formula allowed for better organized operations, and superior logistics. Napoleon's real advantage on the field was not his tactical military technique, which was pretty traditional, but his ability to get his armies to march faster and further to outmanouver his enemies. This allowed him to define not only where the fighting would take place, but often also made it possible for him to keep the enemy armies devided in such a way that he could use his smaller armies to defeat his adeversaries in detail. 

That is a repetative theme, in the Italian campaign, and at Jenna. Austerlitz is the only battle I know of where he clearly outwitted the Austrian and Russian commanders in the immediate field of battle -- other than that it was more or less the line them up, mow them down and then break the line with cavalry and overun the stragglers, SOP. Even at the end, after being defeated in Russia and the subsequent disaster of Liepzig, he managed to stave off defeat for many months simply by rushing his much smaller army from one front to another. 

Nothing new under the sun.

Napoleon had enough sense to see how Romans conquered much of the world in their own day, with similar structures and tactics.

Lessons the European armies threw aside because it didn't match up with their aristocratic preferences for a little bloodstained entertainment, flag waving and glory at the expense of the commoners. A little less greed and he might have easily ruled Europe as dictator for the rest of his life.

Napoleon's merit system was structurally similar to Rome. Centurions were rarely appointed unless they had served 15 years in most cases [the odd time the emperor appointed one] Since they were recruited at 15, it meant half their lives had been spent engaging in warfare. Mid-level "officers " Prefects/evocati etc. were drawn from fighting troops.

Napoleon had enough sense to appoint trusted leaders, and draw from veteran troops for leadership and most promotions were by merit.  Since he had a fair education, I suspect he based this on the above Roman model. 

Troops of different specialties, calvary, spearmen, charioteers, archers, firesetters, medical personnel were trained to take their parts in disciplined waves of attack. A basic form of operational mobility that Napoleon emulated with revisions.

In the Roman army family ties didn't count much at the ground/mid officer level. With a 50% death rate before the age of 30, it's easy to see who were the most likely survival candidates, who could maintain their recruits and who earned the troops' respect while ferocious and cunning in battle.

Napolean at the beginning promoted officers generally on merit. Later, his ego led to micromanagement and merit for submission to rule. Big mistake, as it turned out.

When armies have "schools" that  place 20-year-old academic cadets in charge of troops it's not surprising when the losses mount and the death toll rises due to inexperience, panic and sheer stupidity.  With the Roman/Napoleonic systems it's not hard to see how "academic"  led troops lost battles to the astute Napoleon.

We're seeing those results across the world today.

So I must agree with you, Napoleon certainly had a deep understanding of what modern warfare would entail, partially by understanding past successful/unsuccessful models.

I think that is a good take on it. Though I don't know if I would say that those lessons were completely lost on the rest of Europe. The Austrian and Russian armies were not disorganized rabble.

I also would not count out the effect of the Revolution itself in two areas. First in the fact that the Revolution created a space for Napoleon to rapidly rise through the ranks without his station being a question. Two, the Revolution created a sense of inclusion among common people that I don't think existed in the Roman system -- people were able to feel that they were part of the project, and this created real opportunities for the creation of a "motivated" army, as we say today.

This last factor is particularly present in the Italian Campaign where Napoleon first came to fame.

What is perhaps most significant about the first, and I think this is amply evidenced in the record, is that by having a professional soldier controlling the upper echelons of the command structure, the French were able to tune their whole mobilization effort to the needs of army, and the very organization of the army, based in a real understanding of what was required in the field. On the other hand, while there were certainly very capable officers among the upper ranks of Napoleons adversaries, none of them had the kind of ability to make the kind of sweeping reforms to the entire military aparatus from the perspective of the needs of military aparatus, toward the end of making it efficient and effective.

Getting back to Chamberlain, I really think that proper starting place for a discussion of the causes and events of the Second World War, is here in the Napoleonic wars. It has been observed by some that the occupation and subjugation of Prussia was a fundamental catalyst for the emergence of the forces that were to unify Germany as a nation state with a highly militarist ethos at its core, and that it was the invasion of Russia, and the Russian counter-invasion of France that truly made Russia an central player in Western European politics, where previously Russian interests had traditionally been focussed on Eastern Europe and the south.

I think we can find the basic outline of the geopolitical terrain that emerged in the Great War and the Second World War and that culminated in the Cold War, here, in Napoleon's audacious dash across Europe at the head of the worlds first modern army. 

Is it not possible to say the 100 Year War was the start of the Geopolitical terrain that has shaped Europe for the last few centuries.

This era was produced some of the first revolutions in both England (The peasant revolt against John of Gaunt) and France.

Then there were the Northern Crusades against Eastern Europe that helped shaped the parts of Germany, Poland and Russia.

I wouldn't. Of course you could. But then of course one can trace all this back to Chinghiz Khan's invasion of Europe, if one likes. But I think if you are looking for those distinct features that mark this era, you have to start here.

 For example, the Napoleonic war sets the stage for the creation of a nation state, and Russia becomes an integral player in the alliance structures of Europe. It becomes, for the first time fully integrated into the heart of European politics.

Ok, it appears that I have some reading to do.

Well, I'm of the opinion that  historical events tend to be interconnected. I don't buy the "Great Man Theory" simply because if, as you stated, there had been no revolution, there would have been no Napoleon.

There's also the economic situation at the time since the banking systems were beginning to centralize into deficit reserve agencies which of course, made funding armies a very profitable business, indeed. 

Napoleon's dash may well have been the "test tube run" of how that shady reserve system would ultimately be used. That would place Prussia and Germany as pawns in a very high stakes chess game that most of Europe didn't realize it was playing.

Russia might have been the one unpredictable piece on the board. 

It's the history of vicious empires working toward only one possible conclusion, collapse.  Usurous financial systems drive civilization to war for empire expansion and consuming everything in its wake including democracy. And it's true to form today as the "new" predatory financial capitalism consumes itself according to schedules for inverted pyramids of compounding interest. Human development progressed at a snail's pace for century after century of imperialism giving way to feudalism, colonialism, industrial capitalism with world revolutions,  and now financial capitalism devouring itself. The choices are socialism and the next phase of human development, or barbarism. And the international elite are pushing humanity down the wrong path, once again.

Don't worry Webgear. I suspect Cueball has me totally outclassed in this discussion as well *lol*

TVParkdale

I am not worry, Cueball points only mean that I have to gain more knowledge of European events of the late 1700s and early 1800s.

This era of history has never been an strong point of mine.

Fidel

I think Barbarism could be ok, or perhaps another era of an dark ages.

Life would be a lot simplier that is for sure. 

That was meant to be humorous, Webgear.

Sorry, I did see your humour unfortunately my response was not funny.

I had to think about that for a minute. You could be right, you know? A rebuilding period sometimes works out for professional sports teams. Maybe we need to do a clean sweep of upper management. Paying oppressive levels of tax to overlords and marauding criminal types might not be all that bad by comparison