Iranian election thread

Report: Defeated Ahmadinejad rival arrested in Iran

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1092304.html

This thread on Daily Kos gathers quite a lot of the information that has trickled out today.

Of the latest reports, one that is particularly interesting is the rumour of a national strike on Tuesday. (From this Twitter feed.)

Right now, the opposition, although substantial, seems to be scattershot. It remains to be seen if the Iranians will be able to organize an effective, canalized resistance in the face of repression.

That's a challenge. Although uprisings certainly predate the advent of Twitter/(cell) phones...

The Shah was rather swiftly overthrown in the late '70s at a time where many people thought that the regime had a stranglehold over the population.

West Coast Greeny wrote:

63% to 33% seems way too one-sided, for a race that was supposed to be close

One report I've heard is that the election commission has confirmed that there was fraud.

Also, you can follow an Iranian student who is reporting from on the ground in Tehran on twitter: @tehranelection

But just as a first reaction, this post-election situation looks to me like a crime scene. And here is how I would reconstruct the crime.

As the real numbers started coming into the Interior Ministry late on Friday, it became clear that Mousavi was winning. Mousavi's spokesman abroad, filmmaker Mohsen Makhbalbaf, alleges that the ministry even contacted Mousavi's camp and said it would begin preparing the population for this victory.

The ministry must have informed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who has had a feud with Mousavi for over 30 years, who found this outcome unsupportable. And, apparently, he and other top leaders had been so confident of an Ahmadinejad win that they had made no contingency plans for what to do if he looked as though he would lose.

They therefore sent blanket instructions to the Electoral Commission to falsify the vote counts.

http://www.juancole.com/2009/06/stealing-iranian-election.html

Well there seems to be a fair bit of delusion not only from Western liberal analysts but also a fair share of the Iranian middle class. Up until the end of this week, even US-based opinion polls were showing a big win for Ahmedinejad, precisely by the proportions he did eventually win.

The media coverage has played up a different story, focusing on the Iranian urban middle class, but not on Ahmedinejad's bedrock support amongst the poor and working classes. Seems very similar to what we've seen recently, no? The fact that powerful interests in Iranian society like former president Rafsanjani (who is part of the oligarchy) are opposing Ahmedinejad feeds the hysteria over a stolen election, but it might be at odds with the reality of the voting.

The underlying factor here is the increasingly wide economic and cultural chasm in Iranian society between the urban and rural, and middle and working classes. This definitely heading towards an explosive situation.

Toronto Iranians Protest Against Election Results

http://www.facebook.com/event.php?sid=d5f2df0f78786f0674c3e89833b3f2ec&e...

@ceti: First, about the polls: I haven't seen those "US-based opinion polls [...] showing a big win for Ahmedinejad"—care to provide a link? (Also: shouldn't we wary of a possible inherent bias/weakness in any "US-based" polling if we are to keep in mind the general cautionary argument of your post...?) In any case, the general impression I had gathered was that polling of the election was considered to be: 1) all over the place; 2) wildly unreliable.

I think that there is some merit to your point that Westerners' expectations about the plausibility of the electoral outcome are being distorted by an inaccurate or incomplete view of the political landscape in Iran. That's why I remained slightly skeptical when the first allegations of fraud were made. However, having now been exposed to all the reports, declarations and so on, it seems to me that some of the anomalies are just too big to lead to any other reasonable conclusion than the commission of a fraud. Not that I agree with all he's written in his posts about the Iran election, but still, Juan Cole's post about the evidence of a fraud contains some very strong points.

WRT the latest developments on the ground: there are reports (hard to confirm, as always) of tanks now being in the streets of Teheran... There have also been reports of raids on the offices of NBC and confiscation of cameras; an ABC reporter has confirmed confiscation of their cameras (they have resorted to cell phones to shoot some video); BBC apparently has been told to get out of the country (from the comments of this thread).

It seems pretty obvious that there would've been some fraud, due to the implausibility of this election. For one turnout was only ever anywhere near this high when Mohammad Khatami, the previous reformist President, won back in 1997. Two, the turnout of young people who are far more pro-reformist than they are conservative was up substantially and yet Ahmadinejad wins in a landslide? Obviously something is going on there. Three, Ahmadinejad won by lopsided margins even in Mousavi strongholds like Isfahan and Iranian-Azeri regions, which like all minority populations, tend to support reformist candidates more so than conservative ones. Keep in mind btw, that Mousavi is from the minority Azeri population, and Ahmadinejad winning their votes would've been like McCain winning the African-American vote in 2008.

And the poll does show Mousavi's Azeri background having little impact on the vote (Ahmedinejad still doubling his support). Remember before the last two weeks and the TV debates, Mousavi was little known and had very slim hopes, even if he was PM from 1981 to 1989. The campaign only caught fire after the TV debates so perhaps not enough time to make up the difference.

This is a brave woman. I hope she's okay tonight.

The images, videos, and deluge of minute-by-minute updates are incredible.  2:32 to 2:44 of this.

I'm reminded of photos I'd seen before of Iranians who were publicly beaten, forced to put toilet water cans in their mouths, and then taken away.  Not the worst thing that happened under that regime, surely, but the images just stuck in my mind.

Rumors now from twitter that 30,000 anti-riot Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps are getting ready to crush the uprising.  Live rounds to be used?  Mass killings?  Videos and photos to be used to round up instigators?

I am also a bit wary of the internet, blog, and twitter-led revolutions. What's it to a poor farmer in the countryside?

The same point was made in a Guardian editorial by Abbas Barzegar, Wishful Thinking from Tehran.  I don't understand what provokes that point.  Was anyone suggesting that poor farmers did care about twitter?  The interest in twitter and other media distribution systems right now is, from what I can tell, the window they offer to the outside world of what is indisputably happening in the streets of several Iranian cities right now.  To spin that attention into some kind of claim that many naive people think that the internet is influencing the perceptions of rural or working-class Iranians is unfounded and dishonest.

As for the polls, why would these US and European groups have a reason to bias the poll?

If the poll were conducted by fieldworkers operating within Iran, then I believe I've already answered this question with my observation about punitive disincentives to report the truth if that truth is not to the hardliners' liking (I even provided examples).  However, I now acknowledge, having taken a closer look at the survey (page 25), that the fieldworkers were operating from outside of Iran.  So my original objection was invalid for this poll.  Sorry.

I think you have a limited point about expected biases of TFT.  Limited by it being speculative.  Granted, many of the independent threads of consideration taken by Juan Cole could be called speculative too.  Speculative, in this case, because it presumes, in the case of a biased organization, a particular nature of the bias, and, more significantly, because it presumes that this particular bias would gravitate towards a certain kind of result.  To offer contrary speculation: imagine that the polling organization, having an ulterior agenda informed by Western, pro-Israeli, anti-Islamic prejudice, wanted to portray the Iranian people as unfriendly to the West as a case against the realistic expectations of a policy of diplomacy and dialog.

It's easy to jump on the bandwagon here

I don't think it's sensible to judge someone's inclination to believe that the election was stolen as jumping on the bandwagon.  By that standard I would offer an alternative narrative: that radicals who see the likes of CNN or Fox News or the New York Times reporting that the election was stolen have a strong predilection for believing the opposite, as it is more common and even more fashionable for radicals to believe the contrary of what is reported in the mainstream media.  But that statement is only to illustrate the point -- it is meaningless to attach crass motivations to people's judgements on a speculative basis in this way.

I must admit that I did not find the Wishful Thinking in Tehran piece convincing, despite its manipulative rhetoric.  I found little substantiation of the author's position.  For example, consider this:

In this election moreover, there were two separate governmental election monitors in addition to observers from each camp to prevent mass voter fraud. The sentimental implausibility of Ahmedinejad's victory that Mousavi's supporters set forth as the evidence of state corruption must be met by the equal implausibility that such widespread corruption could take place under clear daylight.

All well and good, except when compared to other accounts.  The following is from an interview with dissident and former foreign minister Ibrahim Yazdi:

There were many, many irregularities. They did not permit the candidates to supervise the election or the counting of the ballots at the polling places. The minister of the interior announced that he would oversee the final count in his office, at the ministry, with only two aides present.

In previous elections, they announced the results in each district, so people could follow up and make a judgment about the validity of the figures. In 2005, there were problems: in one district there were about 100,000 eligible voters, and they announced a total vote of 150,000. This time they didn't even release information about each particular district.

In all, there were about 45,000 polling places. There were 14,000 mobile ones, that can move from place to place. Many of us protested that. Originally, these mobile polling places were supposed to be used in hospitals and so on. This time, they were used in police stations, army bases, and various military compounds. When it comes to the military compounds and so on, if even 500 extra votes were put into each of the 14,000 boxes, that is seven million votes.

Much of the Wishful Thinking piece was generic observation about Western ignorance of the realities of Iranian society.  Worth taking into account, but in my mind it doesn't even come close to explaining the specific inconsistencies described in detail by Juan Cole and others.

My wife's family is from Iran. She still has an aunt there (in Shiraz). As of election day, she wants to get the fuck out. Her whole community is very anti-Ahmadinejad and is very worried about repercussions. Internet and cell phones now appear jammed.

[url=http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/14/AR200906...'s skepticism is justified[/url]

The poll analysis made by the WaPo op-ed writers is marred by some serious flaws.

It's not "minor flaws": this single poll on which some are apparently completely hinging their argument that the possibility of some form of electoral fraud having been committed is to be rejected, that poll itself said that "none of the candidates will likely pass the 50 percent threshold needed to automatically win".

In any case, as a commenter on Juan Cole's blog put it:

Quote:

A reminder to avoid false logical dichotomy: It isn't a question of, did M. really win but A. cheated him out of it, v. did A. really win fairly. Ahmadinejad might have won the vote, but the election still could have been mishandled in various ways (premature release of vote totals, manipulation of a win to make it look even better, suppression of the other side, etc.)

Here's some good analysis from Lenin's Tomb.

The Obama Administration's reaction will be important -- allowing the Iranian people to lead, and not be perceived as interfering. So far, their approach has been the right one.

Khamenei has buckled a little bit, especially as Khatami, Rafsanjani, and many other top clerics are behind Mousavi as well as the fraud claims. 

Interesting points.

From the comments to "About Those Iran Polls":

Let's see: "...telephone poll carried out in mid-May".

1. Using a telephone poll in a country that jails dissenters: If you lived in Iran, to what extent would you trust an anonymous person who called you on the phone to ask who you plan for vote for, for president?
2. Mid-May: That was eons ago. Mousavi came on strong during the 4 weeks preceding the election.

Ballen's and Dougherty's poll was defective.

Michael Herrinton
Oakland, California

Slumberjack wrote:

In speaking with some non-political people from Tehran and Shiraz by telephone today, the impression given is not of a widespread popular movement that has taken to the streets, so much as it has to do with vocal pro-government and pro-opposition supporters out in support of their respective interests.

I don't know if that really washes with demonstrations involving hundreds of thousands of people in an environment where there's some likelihood of being beaten or shot. It's obviously not everyone out on the streets, but it's more than what you could call the usual suspects. Also, the apparent necessity of asking for Hezbollah assistance from Lebanon makes it seem as though the Ahmedinejad-supporting part of the government doesn't fully itrust in the loyalty or support of its own security organizations.

So you say. But then that was not how it worked in 1979, when there was a a clear consensus the Shah was illigitimate.

What would we do without those invaluable wiki sources, and so close at hand with everything you need, that one needn't bother with the inconvienience of looking any further.

Facile logic is exemplified in your "You logic is..."  paragraph.  Presenting a false dichotomy; mischaracterizing others' positions while accusing others of employing strawmen.  Not to mention rephrasing the poll question concerning an elected Supreme Leader beyond all recognition; in a way that you might facetiously argue is logically equivalent, but that is as different from the original as night and day in the context of Iranian society.

Please explain why it is that in the absolute totalitarian dictatorship, where people are so completely paranoid as to not be able to state their opinions, in opinion polls, as you and Michael Herrington (seperated at birth maybe?) are suggesting, have election campaigns with opposition leaders and so on and so forth?

Or perhaps it is entirely a sham, and the opposition leaders are part of the system. A distraction. A sop for public discontent, or so. Very good I can go for that. But why then, in this fascinatingly complex and well organized Orwellian Dystopia would it matter then if you said you like Amedinejad or Mousavi, since both would be part of the state approved Grade "A" hoax?