Not absolute then? Hah. You said that Iranians were too afraid to honestly respond to the opinion poll. Now you are saying there is room for dissent.
You seemed perfectly happy with the opinion polls that supported the view of Iran that Mousavi should take out Amedinejad, and that indicate in your books, massive election fraud.
You said that Iranians were to afraid to honestly respond to the opinion poll. Now you are saying there is room for dissent.
What does "room for dissent" mean, or rather, what do you think it means? Only, by itself it's a meaningless expression, and can be intended to mean whatever is convenient to whomever is using it.
You seemed perfectly happy with the opinion polls
Strawmen?
I see you are sliding away from firm statements and into the mire of vague abstraction and deflection.
On the one hand we have the evidence, twitter, pro-opposition blogs, posters supporting the opposition, speeches rallies and so on and so forth. Yet you have supported this view:
1. Using a telephone poll in a country that jails dissenters: If you lived in Iran, to what extent would you trust an anonymous person who called you on the phone to ask who you plan for vote for, for president?
Heh. ROFL.
On the one hand we have the evidence, twitter, pro-opposition blogs, posters supporting the opposition, speeches rallies and so on and so forth.
Carried out in spaces that aren't controlled by the authorities? And what happens when the authorities reassert control?
Good grief, what has gotten into you? Your cretinous line of argument is akin to claiming that Rosa Parks having sat in a nominally whites-only section of a bus demonstrated that there was no segregation in practice. After all, she sat there, didn't she?
You can't even decide if you object to the poll, or the article which was written about it. Which is it? The poll is flawed? If the poll is flawed why are you quoting the statistics in it, such as that "none of the candidates will likely pass the 50 percent threshold needed to automatically win." If the poll is flawed its flawed. Or is it just convenient for you to cherry pick the data you like. That brings us too the second point, which is that you don't like the way things are put together in the article. Why? Well because you think the author is cherry picking the poll numbers that they like.
I am referring to the WaPo article, which I find objectionable in that it leaves out significant findings of the original poll (a dishonest practice in that those very findings weaken the strength of the op-ed's argument): their finding that "more than 60 percent of those who state they don't know who they will vote for in the Presidential elections reflect individuals who favor political reform and change in the current system", their finding that "none of the candidates will likely pass the 50 percent threshold needed to automatically win", their finding that 27% were "undecided" and the fact that there's an additional 22% that's unaccounted for.
In other words, the poll, while being a relevant data source that provides a richer view of the electoral landscape some 24-33 days before the election and reminds people that Ahmadinejad did have significant support, is far from being so strong a statement so as to neutralize all the facts, inferences drawn from past elections, declarations, behaviour of officials and so on which have led numerous analysts to believe that there's a likely chance that some form of fraud has been committed. One also has to keep in mind that the reasonable assessment of fraud that one can draw from the situation is not "ZOMG! They switched A's and M's votes!!" or even "It's *clear* that M would have won!" but rather "There are some very significant anomalies which seem to point toward some sort of fraudulent meddling with the votes".
BTW: if you take 34 to 14, and then intrapolate that ratio over the numbers of undecided voters, then Amedinejad wins by way over 50%.
Ask the poll's authors: they wrote the contrary in their original report.
Ask the poll's authors: they wrote the contrary in their original report.
But I'd rather pull numbers out of my ass.
On the one hand we have the evidence, twitter, pro-opposition blogs, posters supporting the opposition, speeches rallies and so on and so forth.
Carried out in spaces that aren't controlled by the authorities? And what happens when the authorities reassert control?
Good grief, what has gotten into you? Your cretinous line of argument is akin to claiming that Rosa Parks having sat in a nominally whites-only section of a bus demonstrated that there was no segregation in practice. After all, she sat there, didn't she?
I didnt realize that Mousavi was a "write in" candidate, and that the elections system was run by a bunch of anarcho-syndicalyst cells, and the internet was run by teen hackers, cleverly creating cyberspace free of the "control of the authorities", and that the public parks stadiums used for Mousavi's election speeches were user operated co-operatives, where the police were unable to intervene.
Like Parks, all this happened as unlawful activity proscribed by the state, which is not an "absolute" totalitarian dictatorship, but an on again off again affair.
So you want to retract your comment about twitter and pro-opposition blogs? Your latest attempt at humour is as lacking as earlier tries, see 14000 of 45000 polling locations in police and military installations.
Like Parks, all this happened as unlawful activity proscribed by the state, which is not an "absolute" totalitarian dictatorship, but an on again off again affair.
I don't disagree with this at all.
No according to your source. Your source is saying that this action was a substantively new event. A coup, in fact. Hard to pin you guys down, really. It's a dictatorship where the Islamic authority is supreme. Now Amedinejad has couped the government. Everyone is in total fear all the time, but they still have opposition politicians, rallies, posters, internet blogs, twitter tracking and so on.
People are so afraid they can not say on the phone that they dislike Amedinejad, but can say they want to elect the supreme leader, and want freedom of the press and free elections. When answering these questions they deeply consider their answers, and think, saying that I want freedom of the press and free election, and the ability to elect the Ayatollah because it is "highly abstract" but can not say I won't vote for Amedinejad, even though the opposition candidate is officially on the list.
The only thing consistent in all of this is the penchant for downplaying the legitimacy of the regieme, by whatever means necessary.
I am in Tehran right now. The Internet here is very slow and difficult to use at the moment; so I won't be able to visit here frequently. But I thought I would send one post to clarify things a bit.
First please put aside any notion of US-backed versus US-opposed candidates. The main opponent of Ahmadinejad in this election, Mousavi, was the prime minister of Iran in 80s who led the country during the war with US-backed (and Soviet-backed and EU-backed) Iraq. Other candidates have similar credentials. Their platforms and programs have little to do with what US wants. The United States has no horse in this Iranian election.
This is about the Iranian people and their right to choose their leaders. I was in Tehran as well as a few other small towns in the North in the days leading to election, and based on the signs, posters and people's words, it is unimaginable how Ahmadinejad might have won this election, let alone with such landslide. Of course in a country where the head of the election supervisory body declared his open support for Ahmadinejad prior to election, no one should be surprised at these results.
But the people here just simply couldn't take it. This is beyond a simple matter oe election. It is a response to the suppression of their rights over all these years. On Monday the largest demonstration I had ever seen in Tehran happened, even though the interior ministry had declared it as illegal and had warned they would crack down heavily (MOusavi had asked for permission but the government refused, while they had allowed Ahmadinejad's speech in Tehran Valiasr square a day earlier). Despite the possibility of attack by regime's anti-riot guard, the number of people was several times more than the ones who attended the "official" demonstration in support of Ahmadinejad.
The anti-riot guard and the government-backed Bassij militia have been scattered around the city trying to suppress people's protests. I was witness to their brutality where they were beating up and dragging young protestors into custody. However the protests are more widespread that they could control at the moment. For three decades this regime used to make people show their support in a variety of ways, and now people are using the same methods against it. Chanting from the roofs at nights (which was a common practice during the 1979 revolution), honking while driving around, etc.
Most methods of communication have been cut; SMS system (which was the most favourite method of communication in Iran) is down since Friday. Facebook, youtube, all web sites belonging to the opposition are blocked. Internet is extremely slow (dial up mainly). TV stations (that are all state controlled; there is no private TV in Iran) are showing 50s Comedy shows as if nothing is happening! Yet people manage to inform each other by word of mouth. Every time the anti-riot guard is beating up people, hundreds of cell phones and cameras record it. Even if a few manage to escape confiscation, the pictures and clips show up on the net in a few hours.
This could get real ugly. It all depends on what woudl happen at the highest levels of the government. Mousavi and other candidates showed they had balls by attending the Monday demonstration. Other power centers, some opposed to Ahamdinejad, are trying to negotiate a way out at the top level. Yet the main supporter of Ahmadinejad, the revolutionary guard and their bassij militia, have not stepped in yet. If they do, there could be a bloody coup. Only God could save us then.
I will not be able to post a lot more because of the Internet speed. But will try to give you an update while I am here (for another week, if the airports are not closed down).
BTW: if you take 34 to 14, and then intrapolate that ratio over the numbers of undecided voters, then Amedinejad wins by way over 50%.
Ask the poll's authors: they wrote the contrary in their original report.
I don't need too. I have a MSN calculator. If the 49% of the voters who declined to assert a preference, were to vote along the same lines as those who had decided in the poll that would give Amedinejad 66 % of the vote share. More or less what happened, according to the official tally.
Even if we remove the 22% of those "unaccounted for" and only include the 27% that are accounted for but are "undecided" it would still give Amedinejad 51%.
BTW I just heard that last night (Tehran time) the plainclothes militia attacked the dorms of the University of Tehran and the Isfahan University of Technology and ransacked it. There are rumors that a number of students were killed, and dozens were arrested. A friend of mine at Tehran polytechnic informed me about the possible strike. I will let you know if I find out more.
Good. Keep on posting. And good luck.
Your source is saying that this action was a substantively new event.
Some have remarked that, whereas in the past the clergy would control the outcomes of elections simply by pre-screening who would be allowed on the ballot, in this election there was vote fraud practiced at an unprecedented scale.
A coup, in fact. Hard to pin you guys down, really. It's a dictatorship where the Islamic authority is supreme. Now Amedinejad has couped the government
If you're implying a contradiction: Consider the difference between scenarios 1 and 2 here.
Everyone is in total fear all the time, but they still have opposition politicians, rallies, posters, internet blogs, twitter tracking and so on.
Did the authorities not interfere with all of these things, in some cases brutally? Do you actually think this buttresses your argument?
People are so afraid they can not say on the phone that they dislike Amedinejad, but can say they want to elect the supreme leader, and want freedom of the press and free elections. When answering these questions they deeply consider their answers, and think, saying that I want freedom of the press and free election, and the ability to elect the Ayatollah because it is "highly abstract" but can not say I won't vote for Amedinejad, even though the opposition candidate is officially on the list.
Actually, yes, if we strip away your mocking, derisive posturing from that statement, what's left is completely valid. I reiterate: That an abstract, unactionable question is compared to the question that has a chance of impacting the hardline establishment. That's ridiculous. "I have friends who are black."
If there were actually a referendum over any of the fluffy invitations to speculation cited from the poll as having provoked "politically risky responses," their meaning would be entirely different. There was no campaign of charged intimidation, leading up to the election, against wishing that the Supereme Leader were elected. Mousavi has been the focus of ire of the hardline.
This puts a wrench in the whole no-working-class-involvement theory. Tehran's garbage collectors apparently joined the fun yesterday. On the bad news side of the equation, the chancellor of the University of Tehran is missing after he apparently criticized the attacks on the student residence halls.
Lenin's Tomb has it right I think and explains perfectly the Persian kitty motif as well. "Mousavi is hardly a dangerous candidate for the Iranian ruling class: rather he represents a powerful faction of it." Layla Anwar has some worthy observations on the situation as well: The Latest from Mullahstan and its proxies
http://arabwomanblues.blogspot.com/2009/06/more-from-mullahstans-latest....
and also a good analysis in Asia Times Online 'Rafsanjani's Gambit Backfires':
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KF16Ak05.html
"Khamenei's message to Rafsanjani is blunt: accept defeat gracefully and stay away from further mischief. Friday's election ensures that the house of Supreme Leader Khamenei will remain by far the focal point of power..."
People are so afraid they can not say on the phone that they dislike Amedinejad, but can say they want to elect the supreme leader, and want freedom of the press and free elections. When answering these questions they deeply consider their answers, and think, saying that I want freedom of the press and free election, and the ability to elect the Ayatollah because it is "highly abstract" but can not say I won't vote for Amedinejad, even though the opposition candidate is officially on the list.Actually, yes, if we strip away your mocking, derisive posturing from that statement, what's left is completely valid. I reiterate: That an abstract, unactionable question is compared to the question that has a chance of impacting the hardline establishment. That's ridiculous. "I have friends who are black."
If there were actually a referendum over any of the fluffy invitations to speculation cited from the poll as having provoked "politically risky responses," their meaning would be entirely different. There was no campaign of charged intimidation, leading up to the election, against wishing that the Supereme Leader were elected. Mousavi has been the focus of ire of the hardline.
I have considered all three possibilities. I don't actually have a hardened view, except to say that I know that everything I read in the MSN will be distorted by the preset ideological assumptions of the owners and the editors they hire.
What is bothering me is the animosity there is to this particular poll. Any of the various polls that have been sited, here or elsewhere will reveal flaws in the polling process. No polling process is free of possible contentious problems that one could used to undermine its veracity. Its a matter of how great these variances are and how they are determined. People will always find reasons to support or undermine a particular poll, and in the end these just end up being "arguements" that don't establish anything.
I find your arguement about "abstractions" abstract. To me its a way of having your cake and eating it too. Some results are flawed, but the ones you like are not. You are just looking for reasons for saying that the popular support for Amedinejad indicated in the poll is politically mediated, while other responses are not.
It's not at all good enough. You have siezed on this quixotic arguement of carefully parsed justifications of why the poll results in one question are not accurate, and why they are not necessarily inaccurate in others. You can always argue a poll, as I pointed out. But, either the poll flies or it does not. Either its methodolgy is sound or it is not.
There ends up being this ideological tautology that exists whenever we talk about Iran in the west: We argue, Iran is an unpopular authoritarian state: We can't see the amount of popular dissent against the authoritarian state that should be there, because it is an authoritarian state that is repressing popular dissent, which we would otherwise see more of it if it were not authoritarian. The fact that we can not see as much dissent as there should be proves that it must be an authoritarian state that is repressing dissent.
In this case, the assertion that Iran is an authoritarian state is used to undermine the value of the poll, even though you can offer no evidence whatsoever that the responses were not genuine, except an assertion predicated on a predefined belief that anything that indicates support for the regieme is a fraudulent coercion manipulated by an unpopular regieme. Your assertion proves itself: the lack of apparent dissent in the poll againsts the repression is an indication of the existence of the repression of the dissent against the repression. Therefore you eliminate any unwanted results. Strikingly, you found a way to accept the validity of other results in the poll that suited your existing ontology, which is that Iranians want freedom of the press and free elections, and the right to elect the supreme leadership.
You simply can not wrap your head around possible scenario three: The poll was genuine and there was no hidden political mediation of the poll results, because none was necessary. The respondants answered the questions honestly and openly, just as they did when they answered the other questions. The repression is aimed at the losers of the election who are now trying to manipulate international opinion, destabalized the regieme and foment revolution, if not a coup. The leader of this group is now under the protection of the IRG. He still doesnt seem to be having any trouble issuing statements claiming he is the defrauded victor.
But you are saying that the results of the poll must be a sham because Iran is an unpopular authoritarian regieme, and therefore the results must be politically mediated.
I find your arguement about "abstractions" abstract. To me its a way of having your cake and eating it too. Some results are flawed, but the ones you like are not.
What is abstract?
None of that is theoretical, and I draw my conclusions from those observations. Your "having your cake and eating it too" line is not a response of substance; it is an expression of disapproval of the conclusion that I reach, accompanied by unsubstantiated claims of crass motivations on my part.
You are just looking for reasons for saying that the popular support for Amedinejad indicated in the poll is politically mediated, while other responses are not.
Again, unsubstantiated claims of crass motivations. There is no substance here, only prejudice; a similar response, were I to sink to this level, would be to say that you take the position that the election wasn't rigged as a knee-jerk reaction to the narrative coming from the Western media -- that it is painful to the ego of a self-perceived radical that a political movement adopted as the new darling of the Western media might have the moral high ground, and that this pain eclipses any judgement of actual merit, which also then explains the arguments based on factless insinuations of the character and motivations of anyone advocating the opposing case.
It's not at all good enough. You have siezed on this quixotic arguement of carefully parsed justifications of why the poll results in one question are not accurate, and why they are not necessarily inaccurate in others.
Where have I defended a particular poll whose results challenge the official election outcome? "Carefully parsed justifications"... what does that mean, that you don't actually find any objectionable substance, so you're back to the insinuations game?
You can always argue a poll, as I pointed out. But, either the poll flies or it does not. Either its methodolgy is sound or it is not.
Again, empty insinuations.
The fact that we can not see as much dissent as there should be proves that it must be an authoritarian state that is repressing dissent.
That is a simplistic, inaccurate blanket statement that you apply to all positions that hold that Iran is an authoritarian state. Similar simplistic, inaccurate, mischaracterizing statements could be applied to all who decide that Iran is not an authoritarian state that is repressing dissent, or that there is a reasonable doubt.
even though you can offer no evidence whatsoever that the responses were not genuine, except an assertion predicated on a predefined belief that anything that indicates support for the regieme is a fraudulent coercion manipulated by an unpopular regieme.
Actually, justification has been given for questioning the results of the poll. Whether you agree or disagree is one issue, but that you deliberately choose to sidestep that discussion by mischaracterizing the reason for questioning the results shows intellectual dishonesty and a desire not to engage with the actual issues.
Your assertion proves itself: the lack of apparent dissent in the poll againsts the repression is an indication of the existence of the repression of the dissent against the repression.
This, again, is not the reasoning behind questioning the results of the poll, and I question your motivations for mischaracterizing my position in this way. I look forward to a substance-based rebuttal, from you, of the two Juan Cole pieces that I cited, from the beginning, as expressing a significant part of why I doubt the poll results. That will at least be a meaningful debate.
Strikingly, you found a way to accept the validity of other results in the poll that suited your existing ontology, which is that Iranians want freedom of the press and free elections, and the right to elect the supreme leadership.
You're delusional! Where have I done this?
You simply can not wrap your head around possible scenario three
Clearly, I have not wrapped my head around it -- that I don't accept it as fact is evidence? By that standard, you simply can not wrap your head around scenarios 1 and 2. This is more childish lashing-out, in lieue of actual engagement of the issues.
The leader of this group is now under the protection of the IRG. He still doesnt seem to be having any trouble issuing statements claiming he is the defrauded victor.
This seems to be at the heart of a lot of your judgements -- adopting this false dichotomy where either there is a repressive, authoritarian Iranian regime that never shies away from taking the most direct route to suppressing dissent and curtailing rights, or that there is no case for the Iranian government being a repressive, authoritarian regime. This framework excludes, purposely or not, the gradations of nuance found in authoritarian regimes around the world, through history, where there is a balance employed between maintaining control of society and giving the illusions of freedom and justice, for the purpose of influencing either the masses or particular persons of importance to the regime.
But you are saying that the results of the poll must be a sham because Iran is an unpopular authoritarian regieme, and therefore the results must be politically mediated.
No.
As far as the numbers go, it's a matter of perspective I suppose as to it's popularity. I'm quite comfortable in listening to the views of close associations actually living there who have no religious or political persuasions.
First please put aside any notion of US-backed versus US-opposed candidates.
Any notion? I give them more credit than that.
Facebook, youtube, all web sites belonging to the opposition are blocked. Internet is extremely slow (dial up mainly).
That's odd. The extended circle that I converse with regularly update their facebook accounts all the time, notes and photo pages etc..where I get an auto email each time they do, We have also taken to sharing our favorite Youtube music videos via email back and forth, all of which was being done as late as this past weekend. Maybe they got around to shutting it all down yesterday though.
dKos has had some very good posts on the situation. This is one:
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2009/6/16/2488/28592
Thanks, sanizadeh! Keep posting if you can!
I find your arguement about "abstractions" abstract. To me its a way of having your cake and eating it too. Some results are flawed, but the ones you like are not.What is abstract?
- That there is no referendum on any of the questions said to provoke "politically risky responses" ?
- That there was no 'anti-elected-Supreme-Leader' campaign leading up to the election?
- That the question posed to Iranians that had a chance of impacting the hardline establishment in this election was whom the next President of Iran would be?
None of that is theoretical, and I draw my conclusions from those observations. Your "having your cake and eating it too" line is not a response of substance; it is an expression of disapproval of the conclusion that I reach, accompanied by unsubstantiated claims of crass motivations on my part.
Those three are the "carefully parsed justifications" I was speaking about. The Prima Facie case that such assertions would naturally be considered to be dissident views at odds with the regieme and the foundation of opposition to the established order, is obvious, all your abstractions aside. The protestors feel likewise, it seems.
Demands from the protesters
1. Dismissal of Khamenei for not being a fair leader
2. Dismissal of Ahmadinejad for his illegal acts
3. Temporary appointment of Ayatollah Montazeri as the Supreme Leader
4. Recognition of Mousavi as the President
5. Forming the Cabinet by Mousavi to prepare for revising the Constitution
6. unconditional and immediate release of all political prisoners
7. Dissolution of all organs of repression, public or secret.
12 students reported killed in crackdown after violent clashes
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jun/15/iran-students-protest-electi...
This seems to be at the heart of a lot of your judgements -- adopting this false dichotomy where either there is a repressive, authoritarian Iranian regime that never shies away from taking the most direct route to suppressing dissent and curtailing rights, or that there is no case for the Iranian government being a repressive, authoritarian regime. This framework excludes, purposely or not, the gradations of nuance found in authoritarian regimes around the world, through history, where there is a balance employed between maintaining control of society and giving the illusions of freedom and justice, for the purpose of influencing either the masses or particular persons of importance to the regime.
Not at all. I am challenging the basis upon which the assertion that Iran is particularly "authoritarian", in comparison to other regiemes rests. By what stand is the assertion made? Your formula seem pretty meaningless, since one could speculate that an "authoritarian" regieme might entirely indulge in the practice of "maintaining control of society and giving the illusions of freedom and justice, for the purpose of influencing either the masses or particular persons of importance to the regime" without ever arresting anyone, so deeply do they pursue this arch-machivellian schemata you have posed. It is simply impossible, it would seem, that they might support the principle that opposition persons have the right to express themeselves, and have rights, and so on and so forth, on a level that is not simply some gigantic evil plot.
All societies tend toward the authoritarian when under stress. You pose the point from the perspective of someone who takes the point of view that there is a substantive difference between Iran and other kinds of regiemes. As if being authoritarian is an ideology in itself. It is not. This dichtomy of the authoritarian and the democratic is particularly notable in the kind of ideological combat we are seeing today between the west and Iran. Not all authoritarian regiemes have the same colour, nor to the represent themselves as being such. Iran, is not Turkey under Mustafa Kemal, though both had a tendency to authortitarianism, both also allow a certain amount of dissent within a democratic process, but to step outside of that is to come into conflict with the regieme.
It is very possible to come into conflict with the so called democratic regiemes, and indeed there have been protests, arrests, beatings, and even deaths as recently as the recent G8 summit in England, The extent of repression is proportional to how much the dissenters act to force their view upon the establishment, it is not primarily a matter of how the regieme functions.
This is not to say that England is at present a society in conflict to the extent where the full force of the law is required in order to maintain stability against an well organized insurgent political force, but to demonstrate that the state will react with force. So, its a bit of a clever piece of slieght of hand to position yourself as an observer commenting on "authoritarian" regiemes per se, when authoritarianism is not a matter of political viewpoint, but an expression of power in the service of order, regardless of the stated political motivations.
On the other hand, one does really have to closely observe carefully in order to see real "gradations of nuance found in the internal processes of democratic regimes around the world" in terms of any kind real substantive difference between the Labour Party in England, for example, and its supposed foes the Tories. Of course once one steps outside of that spectrum and actively prosecutes a cause through "direct action", such as street demonstrations and civil disobedience, one can easily find oneself on the bad end of a truncheon, or spending a night in jail, or worse one has to assume now since the US opened up its international secret prison network... but that is just conjecture.
But I do know from first hand experience about these sights, which I have seen first hand even in Canada, of the state "reasserting control" of public space, as it did in Quebec City during the FTAA talks. How different are these events from those that happened in "democratic" Greece, not so long ago?
Coverage of those events were described student riots, not an authoritarian crackdown, or the state "reasserting control."
What I do see is how these images that are indiginous to our societies are cast in a much different light than those that appear as part of the evidence that is used, universally it seems, to highlight the peculiar ferocity of Irans "authoritarian" regieme, in counterpoint to its political enemies the "democratic" regiemes and the underlying subtext of this assertion troubles me because the idea that Iran is an "authoritarian" regieme as oppsed to a "democratic" one, is the primary pivot point upon which the dichotomy of the US propaganda case against Iran rests.
Thanks sanizadeh! Stay safe and update us further if you can.
"I think to call it a soft-coup is actually more appropriate than to call it vote rigging...I think the government of Iran realizes that despite Obama's reconciliatory gestures, the overall posture of the imperialists toward Iran has not changed fundamentally, so they don't view this as a time to lower their guards."
http://revolutionaryflowerpot.blogspot.com/2009/06/larger-context-of-ira...
A couple of articles with insightful background info on the protests.
No Angels in the Iranian Election Fight
"To understand the tumult in Tehran, it's worth stepping back from the mass street protests and the high-wire acts in the corridors of power. This is not a revolution. It's not about regime change. And it's not people power, not yet. It is a naked power struggle that pits competing political and clerical factions against one another."
Sure They Stole It...Up Front and Honestly
"The true silver lining of this tragedy is for the people of Iran. These 'elections' should incontrovertibly demonstrate, to anybody with political eyes to see, that no matter how oppressively anti-democratic an electoral setup, the establishment is still capable of raising people's hopes for 'change' (no matter how miniscule and pathetic), and that it still has the power to fool people and to draw them into a futile act; only to slap them in the face. So, now the people are (hopefully) more likely to put their political hopes in more effective moves in the future."
Chris Floyd deals with western coverage and other aspects of the Iran situation:
Hypocrisy and Hope
http://chris-floyd.com/component/content/article/3/1780-hypocrisy-and-ho...
"Unlike the acquiescent Americans, [or Canadians] seemingly content with cosmetic makeovers of the imperial management, the Iranians may yet force their emblem (Moussavi) to more fully inhabit the role that the times--and their own ardent desires for change - have created for him.."
...Also, the apparent necessity of asking for Hezbollah assistance from Lebanon makes it seem as though the Ahmedinejad-supporting part of the government doesn't fully itrust in the loyalty or support of its own security organizations.
You may be confusing Lebanon's opposition party, named Hezbollah, with the domestic conservative Islamic para-military group in Iran called Ansar-e Hizbollah, which would erroneously imply a level of desperation by the ruling council in the current crisis, beyond the norm that is, in portraying it as having to call upon outside assistance with it's internal security.
There's an extremely helpful post in a DK thread on the issue of the various paramilitary groups (Basij, Ansar Hizbullah, Lebanese Hizbullah) currently active in Iran/in the present conflict.
"No to Western Interference"
http://gazasolidarity.blogspot.com/2009/06/support-iranian-uprising-no-t...
"the battle against theocracy in Iran should be seen as strengthening the fight of the Palestinian resistance..."
"Moussari Himself Did not Expect a Movement of Such Scope:"
http://www.truthout.org/061609F
My expectation is that these events will result in the strengthening of the secular state, regardless of the political results.
I don't know about that. How can something that doesn't exist become strengthened. The most I could see happening, and it's a bit of a stretch at that, is for a few token concessions to be promised, a reform here or there promised, to entice people and their cellphone cameras off the streets. I'd expect the opposition candidates who were vetted by the council in the first place in order to run for election, to be compelled into calling for an end to the demonstrations, in the interest of civil order, again with promises to work away on reforms behind the scenes with the establishment, and then for things to pretty much go back the way its always been.
"Are you ready for war with a demonized Iran?"
Paul Craig Roberts: Why the US Wants to Destabilize the Iranian Elections:
http://www.counterpunch.org/roberts06162009.html
I have suspicion of twitter/txt 1337 led revolutions as well. I can certainly understand the frustration these progressive Iranians are feeling and it looks real, but several recent flash-mob riots in other countries (Ukraine, Georgia, Serbia, Moldova) had most strings being pulled by the neoliberal forces. There is an youtube documentary on such activists and their American PAC connections.
I do hope this doesnt end in an ugly way. Iran is certainly under intense international pressure for some time. And like others said, this will make isolating Iran even easier.
"Mousavi was little known"
> as Prime Minister? In helping to defeat Iraq? Still, 3 out of 10 people in this country probably don't know what an 'Ignatieff' is.
"What's it to a poor farmer in the countryside?"
>Precisely. For it is from their ranks, from the hinterland, that the forces to crush dissent will be assembled, as with Tiananmen, as with Kronstadt, where the local troops didn't want to attack, so they brought in troops from the frontier
"likely chance that some form of fraud has been committed."
>Nixon did everything he could to sabotage the Democrats in 72, yet he probably would have won in a landslide anyway. It doesn't mean he was innocent. As said about OJ and the dumbass cops who tried to manufacture extra evidence against him, maybe "he was guilty AND he was framed"
"not an "absolute" totalitarian dictatorship, but an on again off again affair."
>I'd actually say that's a pretty accurate description of the Iranian state. A highly authoritarian, oppressive state which allows for a little freedom as long as it remains contained, and where, when it does not, the clampdown is swift and brutal
"For instance, nearly four in five Iranians -- including most Ahmadinejad supporters -- said they wanted to change the political system to give them the right to elect Iran's supreme leader, who is not currently subject to popular vote."
>And there's the rub. Even if the results were legit, the protests have turned into something bigger than support for Mousavi. Protests have a way of getting bigger. The American revolution didn't really take off amongst the population until Thomas Paine wrote a pamphlet suggesting that the rebellion could just be about something more than the autonomy of the local millionaires. (ok, ok, we can debate how that dream turned out later
). People join peace groups as lefty liberals and wind up as wild eyed socialists. Hell, it sure happened to ME.
"But the people here just simply couldn't take it. This is beyond a simple matter oe election. It is a response to the suppression of their rights over all these years."
>As one of the protestors said in the Toronto Star today,
"After 90 minutes, she found her brother hovering inside a doorway, just as worried about her as he was about him - and just as bloodied. But instead of going home, brother and sister jumped back into the fray, chanting slogans and playing cat-and-mouse with the cops until just before 6 a.m.
"I learned from my mother you fight for your rights. Your rights are something you take, not something you're given," Anousheh said.
http://www.thestar.com/article/651388
"the idea that Iran is an "authoritarian" regieme as oppsed to a "democratic" one, is the primary pivot point upon which the dichotomy of the US propaganda case against Iran rests."
>Agreed. As Carlin said Americans don't have rights, they have temporary priviledges. I don't like the crackdown on the Iranian protesters, anymore than the systemic crackdown on dissent in the west in 1970 around Kent State, Jackson State, the phony hardhats, martial law in Canada....
"the establishment is still capable of raising people's hopes for 'change' (no matter how miniscule and pathetic), and that it still has the power to fool people and to draw them into a futile act"
> Ignatieff or Harper? YOU decide! 
And on Admadinijad's side, the media has pointed out that he brought the rural population things like electricity and clean water. Pretty powerful loyalty builders there.
I don't know about that. How can something that doesn't exist become strengthened. The most I could see happening, and it's a bit of a stretch at that, is for a few token concessions to be promised, a reform here or there promised, to entice people and their cellphone cameras off the streets. I'd expect the opposition candidates who were vetted by the council in the first place in order to run for election, to be compelled into calling for an end to the demonstrations, in the interest of civil order, again with promises to work away on reforms behind the scenes with the establishment, and then for things to pretty much go back the way its always been.
Secular state structures? Not all aspect of government are determined through religious edict. What might even be a possibility here is that the religious oligarchy might begin to be backgrounded, in favour of more secular state institutions, as the monarchy is backgrounded in constitutional monarchies. I think that a "constitutional religious Republic" is a very good description of Iran. The question, as with constitutional monarchies, is how much real control the oligarchs have, and how much real control the other organs of the state have.
Regardless of what this is about, and who started it, and what solution will be found for resolving the issues, it is clear that the religious oligarchs have been embarassed to the point where they have been forced to back down on issue like investigating the charges of election fraud. Being forced to do that, regardless if it is a real process or not, can not help but weaken the authortiy of the religious schools.
There are several models of Islamic states where Mullah's and Imam's act as advisors to the secular authority on religious matters, but are not the absolute brokers of right of wrong. The Caliphate, actually, is one were this kind of system was in place to a greater or lesser extent throughout it history, if I remember the my history correctly. A lot depended on the strength of the secular ruler. The Ottoman Empire is another obvious example.
Absolute Guardianship of the Islamic Jurists where the Mullah's directly run the government, seems to be something peculiar to Iran in the modern era, and is an idea largely developed by the Ayatollah Khomeini. It is by no means cast in stone, as the manner of Shia Islamic government.
I see the system they have developed as bearing remarkable similarities with the theocratic underpinnings at play within several US jurisdictions. Having played for so long upon the fears and emotions associated with a dogmatic view of religion, buffing the genie's bottle as it were to a high sheen for political gain, while facilitating the creation of base institutions and organizations fanatically dedicated to its longevity and proliferation, anyone who comes forth to challenge the veracity of minor aspects of those models, even from within, runs the risk of being ostracized at the very least. Staying within limited boundaries of expression ensures survivability, which perpetuates the entire apparatus up to and including the point where it eventually might be overcome by external forces that become fed up with the status quo. Change is resisted up to and beyond the bitter end, as we see in the US Republican model.
I don't really believe in absolutes. I think you are just being pessemistic, But have no fear, there is plenty of room for pessimism, one of the possible outcomes is the strengthening of the real secular authority of Amedinejad, which to a certain extent has been kept in check by some of the more moderate forces within the religious oligarchy.
This would have pros and cons. One of the pros might be a real lessening of the authority of the religious oligarchy in favour of a more modern state structure, the con in this case is that it might more clearly resemble fascism.
Well, not so much in absolutes as being absolute, unchangeable. Just recognizing that any real change will not occur overnight, and where we've become accustomed to instant gratification, and tend to look at anything else that doesn't occur in front of our eyes as quickly as we would like as a failure and lost cause. Unfortunately when those who revel in instant gratification have the power to destroy everything in it's path to speed up the process for its own benefit, while actually impeding the evolutionary process at the same time, then you see where the problems are compounded, piled on top of one another.
Iran's senior Ayatollah Slams Election
"No one in their right mind can believe" the official results from Friday's contest, Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri said of the landslide victory claimed by Ahmadinejad. Montazeri accused the regime of handling Mousavi's charges of fraud and the massive protests of his backers "in the worst way possible.""A government not respecting people's vote has no religious or political legitimacy," he declared in comments on his official Web site. "I ask the police and army personals (personnel) not to 'sell their religion,' and beware that receiving orders will not excuse them before God."
US asked Twitter to stay online after Iran vote
With any luck this will lead to a REAL peoples revolution in Iran - like what could have happened in 1979 but didn't because it got hijacked by the religious freaks. Wouldn't it be great if there was mass civil disobedience in Iran and eventually the government fell and then all those evil religious police could nbe hunted down and put on trial for their atrocities etc... But its probably too much to hope for.
Hmm, and here I thought twitter stayed online because of the #nomaintenance hashtag pressure from its users...figures!
“Few Americans were[url=http://www.blackagendareport.com/?q=content/freedom-rider-ahmadinejad-wins] aware[/url] that Iran has even a limited democracy.” Yet, today most of them have an opinion as to whether or not Iran's recent election was rigged. In typical egocentric fashion, Americans and their corporate media believe the Iranian election revolved around that country's relations with – guess who? - the United States.
yikes, babblers are fixated on politics here.
can someone please just post some links that provide some insight on Mousavi's economic inclinations; anything about him or his associates actual statements or behaviour with respect to a) oil b) nukes c) currency, and with respect to which corporations or people globally.
really, i've been skimming here and at rabble and while i understand the energy of the moment, protests and violence do have a tendency to become worlds unto themselves. the actual people who are acting in violence sometimes doesn't get sorted out til later. by then sometimes its too late.
i'm v. tight for time these days, and would really appreciate some background here on the opposition leaders $$ alliances. i understand that any leader can change their tune these days, and realign differently, with different bankers and corps later, but so far on rabble/babble we have zero info on any of this, as far as i can see.
thanks for any help here.
you obviously haven't read the links already posted - go back and read the Asia Times article I posted yesterday for a start.
you're correct i haven't read the links, because no verbage from babblers indicated they included anything of economic material.
you folks here have to remember that readers, if you want more readers, do skim when busy.
so i'll go look at that link now, thanks.
