I am not trying to convince anyone whether the war is illegal or unjust, I am only providing a level of detail that is not known or discussed in these threads. I am also providing correct facts to some people's statements such how IEDs are used and tribal police and militia.
I would recommend that you attempt some studying before you post next time.
Inshallah my friend.
I am not trying to convince anyone whether the war is illegal or unjust, I am only providing a level of detail that is not known or discussed in these threads. I am also providing correct facts to some people's statements such how IEDs are used and tribal police and militia.
I would recommend that you attempt some studying before you post next time.
Inshallah my friend.
What a bunch of bullshit. You don't seem to understand the difference between traditional tribal Afghan police and an American created Afghan tribal militia.
Most babblers don't give a shit about the capabilities and characteristics about rockets, mortars, AK-47s, RPGs, etc. It has no bearing or relevance to the issues we are discussing.
During Tet 1968, Vietnam, the U.S. military stated the Tet Offensive was a strategic defeat for the Viet Cong.
The American public and the mainstream media largely saw it as a Communist victory. The majority of public opinion turned against the war.
Who was right?
They both were. Strictly speaking, from a limited military perspective, the Viet Cong had suffered a colossal military defeat.
What the military could not and does not to this day, understand, is that people's (a public's) social, political and moral perceptions are what win or lose wars, not actions on the battlefield alone.
Ok, prove to me the difference between traditional tribal police forces and the tribal militias, I will let you choose any region or province to present your case.
Try and do it under 10,000 words if possible.
Air Force to Pull Helicopters in 2011
http://www.ottawacitizen.com/news/force+pull+helicopters+2011/3144568/st...
"The Canadian air force is planning to withdraw all of its helicopters from Afghanistan within a few weeks of the end of Canada's combat mission next July, the air force general responsible for generating aircraft and crews for the war in South Asia said Friday...
The general, who was in Kandahar for three days to meet with air and maintenance crews also said that Canada is still ' at least four or five years away' from fielding ATTACK DRONES..
Canada's only drones in Kandahar are Israeli made Herons. With modifications the Heron is capable of launching weapons..."
Another benefit of the Canada-Israel Free Trade Agreement or perhaps the Canada Israel Security Agreement? In any case a perfect candidate for the BDS campaign!
Webgear, what is it you're trying to tell us about the phony war in Afghanistan? I can't speak for FrmrSldr, but I must say that I am very impressed with your knowledge of war and imperialist tactics in prolonging war for no particular reasons. And I'm willing to bet you have something important to say and simply need some encouragement at this point. So feel free to tell us what's on your mind about this noble war to bring freedom and liberal democracy to Afghans in general.
Ok, prove to me the difference between traditional tribal police forces and the tribal militias, I will let you choose any region or province to present your case.
Try and do it under 10,000 words if possible.
It has little to do with exhaustively collecting every last bit of forensic evidence (proof) to make one's case. It has more to do about the political handling of the war by the U.S.A./NATO/ISAF and the negative impact we are making on Afghan society by our presence and waging war against Afghanistan's people.
Tribal police protect villagers from crime. American armed and supported militias have been politicized. They have been trained (indoctrinated) that the Taliban and insurgents are their enemy, They have been trained to kill Taliban and other insurgents. They are encouraged to seek out and engage in combat with Taliban or insurgents who may be attempting to have a presence in the area.
Because these militias now overtly oppose the Taliban or other insurgents, they might as well paint a bullseye on their backs as they have been made a target for the Taliban/insurgents by the good ol' U.S.A.
How hard is this to figure out?
Air Force to Pull Helicopters in 2011
http://www.ottawacitizen.com/news/force+pull+helicopters+2011/3144568/st...
"The Canadian air force is planning to withdraw all of its helicopters from Afghanistan within a few weeks of the end of Canada's combat mission next July, the air force general responsible for generating aircraft and crews for the war in South Asia said Friday...
The general, who was in Kandahar for three days to meet with air and maintenance crews also said that Canada is still ' at least four or five years away' from fielding ATTACK DRONES..
Canada's only drones in Kandahar are Israeli made Herons. With modifications the Heron is capable of launching weapons..."
Another benefit of the Canada-Israel Free Trade Agreement or perhaps the Canada Israel Security Agreement? In any case a perfect candidate for the BDS campaign!
What the general is saying then, is that Canandian Air Force personnel will be disengaged from Afghanistan by 2011, but there will still be an Air Force presence (in the form of attack drones) in Afghanistan.
The bullshit is piling up so high in Afghanistan we need wings just to stay above it.
here's more:
Report: Pakistan ISI Backs Taliban
http://www.presstv.com/detail.aspx?id=130187§ionid=351020401
"A new report has suggested that Pakistan's intelligence agency is supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan, providing them with funds and training. The report released Sunday by the London School of Economics (LSE) says that support for the Taliban is the 'official policy' of Pakistan's powerful Inter Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) and the body provides funds and sanctuary for the militant group on a larger scale than previously thought.
Pakistan appears to be playing a double game of astonishing magnitude, said the report's author Matt Waldman.."
as are our 'representatives' who know full well the imperial masters will require Canada's presence there somewhat longer..
NDDP
The Heron contract ceases next year, in July I beleive. There currently no replacement unit 2015.
Fidel
No encouragement is needed. I study and learn because I am a professional.
Frmsldr
Collecting and providing evidence is not your strong point, I understand that. Maybe you look at post #83 and #95 and re-evaluate your answer in regards to the tribal police issues especially in regards to Kandahar province.
Thanks WG
Tribal police protect villagers from crime. American armed and supported militias have been politicized. They have been trained (indoctrinated) that the Taliban and insurgents are their enemy, They have been trained to kill Taliban and other insurgents. They are encouraged to seek out and engage in combat with Taliban or insurgents who may be attempting to have a presence in the area.
Because these militias now overtly oppose the Taliban or other insurgents, they might as well paint a bullseye on their backs as they have been made a target for the Taliban/insurgents by the good ol' U.S.A.
Enlighten me, Webgear. Show me the error in logic of my argument.
Hint: A good place to start is to get your key terms/concepts clear.
Tell me, what (universally) is the difference between police and soldiers (militia included.)
Why is the U.S. military and CIA arming and supporting tribal militias (as I would put it) or tribal police (as you would put it)?
1. The U.S. military and CIA are bleeding hearts and truly care about Afghans.
2. The U.S. military and CIA are a bunch of imperialists and racists who think they know how to run Afghan society better than Afghans do and feel a need to prove it to the rest of the world.
3. The U.S military and CIA don't give a shit about Afghans. They are arming and supporting tribal militias to give the U.S. government breathing space over Afghanistan: If the tribal militias COIN strategy results in fewer U.S./NATO/ISAF casualties, then Western governments can lie to their publics about bringing the troops home sooner. If the strategy fails, then governments can use that as an excuse to keep the troops longer in Afghanistan because obviously, our Afghan "charges" aren't capable of looking after themselves and we'll need to help them just a bit longer (indefinitely/eternally.)
ETA
... the people of Kandahar don't want the protection of foreign troops.
... The U.S. officials in Marja are trying to convince local residents, in effect, that they should trust the foreign troops to protect them from the Taliban, but the Taliban are still able to credibly [sic] to punish those who collaborate with occupation foces.
About a dozen people have been killed for such collaboration already, and many more have been warned to stop,...
... The fact that the U.S.-NATO forces could not clear the Taliban from Marja despite such an unusually heavy concentration of troops is devastating evidence that the McCrystal strategy has failed.
Throughout 2009, media coverage of the war was focused on plans for a new offensive strategy that promised to turn the war around. But Thursday's double dose of bad news suggests a cascade of news stories to come that will reinforce the conclusion that the war is futile.
That in turn could lead to what might be an "Iraq 2006 moment" - the swift unraveling of political support for the war on the part of the elected and unelected political elite, as occurred in the Iraq War in the second half of 2006. The collapse of elite political support for the Iraq War followed months of coverage of sectarian violence [ETA: Know anything about Sunni and Shia "neighborhood protection militias?] showing the U.S. military had lost control of the war.
McChrystal is still hoping, however, to be given much more time to change the attitudes of the population in Helmand and Kandahar.
... McChrystal and his boss, CENTCOM chief Gen. David Petraeus, may now be counting on pressure from the Republican Party to force President Barack Obama to reverse his present position that withdrawal of U.S. troops will begin next year.
http://original.antiwar.com/porter/2010/06/12/mcchrystal-faces-iraq-2006...
I love the smell of victory in Afghanistan.
The Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) is a lightly armed, quickly trained experimental program that began in early February 2009 that aims to establish a persistent security presence in some of the most insecure areas of Afghanistan. APPF is a special security mission under the command of the Afghan Ministry of Interior and is primarily charged with protecting communities, schools, government installations and highways that are continually threatened by insurgent elements. The pilot program is underway in Wardak province, where there are only 1,200 ANP and ANA to protect a population of 500,000.28 According to General McKiernan, who commanded ISAF until June 2009, the APPF is "a means to use a community-based, bottom-up approach to improve security."29
The APPF is modeled on traditional Pashtun tribal force structure called the Arbakais, which enforce the settlements of tribal disputes. However, the APPF serve in a public protection capacity rather than a law enforcement capacity; tribal power brokers will agree to a contract with the Afghan government and ISAF to "expel and deter insurgents, field APPF recruits and perform guard duties" in exchange for greater influence over local affairs.30 The APPF operate at the district level and they are chosen by the district leaders.31 Once they are vetted and approved by the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI), recruits are trained during a three-week program.32
The APPF is expected to expand from the Saydabad district of Wardak to 40 districts. It will consist of roughly 8,000 members by July 2009, and will focus on securing the ring-road from Kabul to Kandahar.33 As of March 2009, over 243 recruits from Saydabad had received training while 200 recruits from the neighboring district of Jalrez had begun training.34 The program is set to be reviewed by CSTC-A before the summer of 2009.35 If found to be effective, the APPF model will likely be extended and expanded in an attempt to secure the population of insecure regions until sufficient ANP and ANSF forces can be fielded, trained, equipped and deployed.
A controversial program, the APPF has met with criticism for bearing resemblance to the old militias. The short training of the force is also a major concern for critics.36 The transferability of the program to other parts of the country has been questioned, and many observers are warning against the long term adverse consequences of rearming local forces.37
Tribal Jurisdiction and Agreements
In many parts of Afghanistan, non-state institutions remain relevant to security and stability, despite repeated and concerted state-led attempts from the late 19th century onward to expand its administrative influence, including control over the provision of security and the administration of justice. In the East and Southeast, these relatively autonomous structures are very much a present day reality and largely linked to Pashtun tribes and the influence of individual elders. It is important to emphasize that tribal security and governance never was geared toward undermining the state. In contrast, tribes and their elders tried to cooperate with the state whenever possible to improve governance and reduce conflict in their areas, taking on state roles during times of state failure.
Afghanistan: A History of Utilization of Tribal Auxiliaries
Tsalweshtai, or a guard force, normally composed of forty men, composed of members of various subsections of the tribe and appointed by the tribe for some special purpose, such as protecting an isolated valley from raiding gangs. This seems to be more commonin the northwestern portion of Pashtun territory. There is a specific tribal injunction to ensure that no blood feud results if someone is killed by a tsalweshtai on duty.
Framing these regional power struggles-and any new ground-up strategy-are a complex and baffling array of tribal actors. Pashtuns are represented by dozens of major tribal groups (though two "super tribes," the Durrani and Ghilzai, have historically been among the most influential) with hundreds of subtribes. The most sought-after partnership discussed in any potential U.S.-NATO-Afghan tribal cooperation would involve the arbakai. Akin to local police and courted by the Karzai government, the arbakai defend communities and enforce the decisions of tribal councils, or jirgas. A September 2004 report (PDF) by the International Legal Foundation describes their traditional duties: "In ancient Aryan tribes, the Arbakai led groups of warriors in wartime and maintained law and order in peacetime. Today, they take orders from a commander. They are given considerable immunity in their communities and cannot be harmed or disobeyed. Those who flout these rules are subject to the punishments set by the Arbakai organization." More recently, these self-regulating militias have been especially adept (Economist) at keeping the Taliban at bay in areas where tribal structures are strongest. Pashtun tribes adhere to an ancient code of honor and revenge known as Pashtunwali; the Taliban have struggled to promote their vision of sharia law in Pashtunwali regions, the Economist notes. But experts say it would be premature to assume Pashtun militias would be open to cooperating with international forces: Pashtun disdain for outsiders is not discriminatory.
Kandahar? Kandahar? What's Kandahar?
http://www.thenation.com/blog/kandahar-kandahar-whats-kandahar
"Don't look now but President Obama's Afghanistan strategy is collapsing on his head.."
US Identifies Vast Riches of Minerals in Afghanistan
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/14/world/asia/14minerals.html
"The US has discovered nearly $1 Trillion in untapped mineral deposits in Afghanistan, far beyond any previously known reserves and enough to fundamentally alter the Afghan economy and perhaps the Afghan war itself, according to senior American government officials.."
here's more:
Report: Pakistan ISI Backs Taliban
http://www.presstv.com/detail.aspx?id=130187§ionid=351020401
"A new report has suggested that Pakistan's intelligence agency is supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan, providing them with funds and training.
Yes of course! And the ISI, which has controlled the Taliban, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Mullah Omar etc., is an extension of the American CIA. Omar was one of the Taliban mullahs who were most agreeable to dealing with US and Argentinian energy companies in the late 1990s. These guys know their way around Washington and Houston like the backs of their hands.
US Identifies Vast Riches of Minerals in Afghanistan
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/14/world/asia/14minerals.html
Sigh... I'm not sure if this is a blessing or a curse...
An explanation?
The Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) is a lightly armed, quickly trained experimental program that began in early February 2009 that aims to establish a persistent security presence in some of the most insecure areas of Afghanistan. APPF is a special security mission under the command of the Afghan Ministry of Interior and is primarily charged with protecting communities, schools, government installations and highways that are continually threatened by insurgent elements. The pilot program is underway in Wardak province, where there are only 1,200 ANP and ANA to protect a population of 500,000.28 According to General McKiernan, who commanded ISAF until June 2009, the APPF is "a means to use a community-based, bottom-up approach to improve security."29
The APPF is modeled on traditional Pashtun tribal force structure called the Arbakais, which enforce the settlements of tribal disputes. However, the APPF serve in a public protection capacity rather than a law enforcement capacity; tribal power brokers will agree to a contract with the Afghan government and ISAF to "expel and deter insurgents, field APPF recruits and perform guard duties" in exchange for greater influence over local affairs.30 The APPF operate at the district level and they are chosen by the district leaders.31 Once they are vetted and approved by the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI), recruits are trained during a three-week program.32
The APPF is expected to expand from the Saydabad district of Wardak to 40 districts. It will consist of roughly 8,000 members by July 2009, and will focus on securing the ring-road from Kabul to Kandahar.33 As of March 2009, over 243 recruits from Saydabad had received training while 200 recruits from the neighboring district of Jalrez had begun training.34 The program is set to be reviewed by CSTC-A before the summer of 2009.35 If found to be effective, the APPF model will likely be extended and expanded in an attempt to secure the population of insecure regions until sufficient ANP and ANSF forces can be fielded, trained, equipped and deployed.
A controversial program, the APPF has met with criticism for bearing resemblance to the old militias. The short training of the force is also a major concern for critics.36 The transferability of the program to other parts of the country has been questioned, and many observers are warning against the long term adverse consequences of rearming local forces.37
Tribal Jurisdiction and Agreements
In many parts of Afghanistan, non-state institutions remain relevant to security and stability, despite repeated and concerted state-led attempts from the late 19th century onward to expand its administrative influence, including control over the provision of security and the administration of justice. In the East and Southeast, these relatively autonomous structures are very much a present day reality and largely linked to Pashtun tribes and the influence of individual elders. It is important to emphasize that tribal security and governance never was geared toward undermining the state. In contrast, tribes and their elders tried to cooperate with the state whenever possible to improve governance and reduce conflict in their areas, taking on state roles during times of state failure.
Afghanistan: A History of Utilization of Tribal Auxiliaries
Tsalweshtai, or a guard force, normally composed of forty men, composed of members of various subsections of the tribe and appointed by the tribe for some special purpose, such as protecting an isolated valley from raiding gangs. This seems to be more commonin the northwestern portion of Pashtun territory. There is a specific tribal injunction to ensure that no blood feud results if someone is killed by a tsalweshtai on duty.
Framing these regional power struggles-and any new ground-up strategy-are a complex and baffling array of tribal actors. Pashtuns are represented by dozens of major tribal groups (though two "super tribes," the Durrani and Ghilzai, have historically been among the most influential) with hundreds of subtribes. The most sought-after partnership discussed in any potential U.S.-NATO-Afghan tribal cooperation would involve the arbakai. Akin to local police and courted by the Karzai government, the arbakai defend communities and enforce the decisions of tribal councils, or jirgas. A September 2004 report (PDF) by the International Legal Foundation describes their traditional duties: "In ancient Aryan tribes, the Arbakai led groups of warriors in wartime and maintained law and order in peacetime. Today, they take orders from a commander. They are given considerable immunity in their communities and cannot be harmed or disobeyed. Those who flout these rules are subject to the punishments set by the Arbakai organization." More recently, these self-regulating militias have been especially adept (Economist) at keeping the Taliban at bay in areas where tribal structures are strongest. Pashtun tribes adhere to an ancient code of honor and revenge known as Pashtunwali; the Taliban have struggled to promote their vision of sharia law in Pashtunwali regions, the Economist notes. But experts say it would be premature to assume Pashtun militias would be open to cooperating with international forces: Pashtun disdain for outsiders is not discriminatory.
This underscores what I have been saying exactly:
1. One example was given of a traditional police force but it was later described as providing protection against the Taliban and insurgents not from the area. Therefore, in the end, all examples given show that they have been corrupted/perverted into militia to fight the Taliban and insurgents.
2. One example was given that support came from "state" (provincial, district?) and national government. The Karzai regime is Uncle Sam's little puppet in Kabul. In other words, the reason why these militias are supported by the nominally Afghan government is because this is a directive loyally done under Uncle Sam's bidding.
Conclusion, all the examples given are described as soldiers who belong to a tribal army whose job is to protect the community against Taliban and insurgents who are not from the area.
Thanks, Webgear.
US Identifies Vast Riches of Minerals in Afghanistan
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/14/world/asia/14minerals.html
Sigh... I'm not sure if this is a blessing or a curse...
It's a curse.
One of the reasons for both the Afghan war and the eternal prolongation of the war is because big corporations stand to make a lot of money out of this war and Afghanistan:
The arms industry supplying the tools of war. The oil industry with the proposed construction of the Trans Afghan Pipeline. Mining Industries: While Afghanistan may not have as much oil as the Caspian Sea basin countries (it still has enough for Unocal to be interested), it is the most mineral rich country in the world when it comes to strategic minerals. U.S. survey and mining companies had checked Afghanistan out prior to the war, make no mistake.
This is something U.S. mining companies and the government don't want you to know about.
Long thread. Closing.
