Could a change be happening in Canada's National politics?

I always react to the "change is happening" theory in politics. We hear how slow change is. The truth is that there is no evidence to support this view. Political change is rapid when it happens. I see politics as a series of tipping points where pressure builds and then sudden change happens. The illusion of slow political change comes from averaging the rapid change over the long periods of inertia.

I say this here becuase of the title, but also to make the point that people often see political surprises becuase they see a power structure that seems resistant to change; able to withstand scandal and other bad news. Then suddenly it changes and we re-imagine a process in hindsight to average all that inertia with the earthquake.

People who have been here a while might remember what I wrote in 2010. There were prediction of 4-5 NDP seats after Mulcair's election. At the time I stated that was the least likely: the NDP would either burst through with over 20 seats or remain shut out with Mulcair and maybe one more. The reason is simple: people are similar to each other. What makes one person become ready for change makes many more or does not exist. A power when it is weak cracks - a crack will go across the entire surface -- not just a corner. slow political change is an illusion - we usual wait a long time for it but when it happens it is much more significant.

Having said that the NDP has a problem -- it is withdrawn to a small natural state. Without change the next election for the NDP will be heart-breaking especially since the vote is spread out and likely more inefficient than it has been in a long time. 18% of the vote with nothing in Quebec (as was the previous 2011 situation) would produce more seats than 20% spread evenly across the country. In the last election the NDP was still more concentrated in Quebec and able to get more seats there. (The 2015 result gave the NDP 28 outside Quebec and 16 inside also benefiting greatly from incumbancy). These numbers may be comparable to previous numbers but this should be seen with caution given the much larger House.

However, if something propels the party upwards, it would take little additional support to change the story. At about 23% the NDP vote would likey produce a larger number of seats. The party is tracking between 15 and 18% mostly now. A bump of 5-8 points is quite possible during a writ period (as is a loss of that much).

My concern is that the scenarios that would give rise to an NDP bump are less likely than those that could produce an equal size loss which would put the party below party status:

1) difficulty matching other parties in spending

2) close Lib-Conservative fight drive more to vote strategically - this can happen if the Bernier party does not succeed in drawing votes from the Conservatives. The likelihood of a possible Conservative government could drive NDP voters to the Liberals.

3) If the Bernier party gets traction and the Conservatives move to the right on some issues to contain it, this could set up the very battle the Liberals want where the risk of a Conservative government is reduced but the risk of damage should it win after all is increased.

4) Voters may vote out of concern for the economy which unfairly is bad for the NDP

However, scenarios such as the following are also possible:

1) sympathy for the third party seen as an underdog

2) If Bernier's party gets traction, then the Conservatives could be less of a threat making it more attractive to vote NDP to mitigate a Liberal win or protest "safely."

Then there is the dynamic a low NDP vote at the start of the campaign could deliver:

1) An NDP vote that is below its normal capacity could produce a correction that could provide momentum upwards. Low expectations when confounded are often not just corrected but an over-correction can occur.

2) A strong campaign from Singh (possibly even one directed towards those who looked with hope to the Liberals in 2015 but who have been disapointed) would come as a surprise and could throw many presumptions and even preferences out the window and a new dynamic could occur.

3) Canadians over the last few decades seem to have warmed up to the notion of minority governments and could vote for smaller parties without concern about creating one.

4) The sleeper issue of supporters of election reform could bite the Liberals if they asked the NDP to support them in the FPTP system as it would highlight the broken promise. I suspect there may still be more supporters of PR than present supporters of the NDP, even if this is a minority. The way the Liberals broke their promise on this is not pretty.

There is another dynamic which is the Green vote. This conventionally may lead some to presume that it is bad news for the NDP, and it could be, but it could also narrow things to the benefit of the NDP in terms of dynamics such as increasing the momentum against the major parties and changing the narrative of the election. It could also lead to some tag-teaming between the Greens and the NDP on issues where the fact that more than one party could make the same argument could be mutually supportive as we saw in the 2011 debates.

The greatest political variable, however, is not the NDP, as much as many may suggest that it is. This variable remains with the Liberals. The Conservatives hate Trudeau and that is a given. How people left of the Conservatives feel about Trudeau is a significant question. If Trudeau loses some votes to the Conservatives but they lose a corresponding number of votes to Bernier's party, the Liberals might look weaker on the left than they are prepared for. If the anger at Trudeau, which is mostly coming from the right in the population, spreads to the left, then the NDP has an opening if all else good happens for the NDP. However, if the left is largely satisfied with Trudeau and concerned by the Conservatives the Liberals are much less vulnerable.

Another two variables remain the economy generally and also how foreign relations affect it. This election, given relations between Canada and China and Trump, could make foreign relations more of an issue than usual in a Canadian  election.

The last variable is the dynamic of social media and manipulation. This ought not to be taken lightly. Canada has much greater risk even than the US in this area for a couple simple reasons:

1) Canadian elections are less expensive, so it costs less to manipulate it

2) With the limitations on corporate donations, there is a real atttraction to shadowy social media spending that could be even greater than in the US

3) There seems to be a denial of the potential for election meddling in Canada and a presumption that the only risk of it would come from the Russians. As such, I think Canada is not preparing well enough for the kind of manipulation we are most likely to see. Corporate and big money efforts to influence the campaign are a significant threat from inside the country and there are more threats from US interests that are far greater in Canada and have significant policy desires, more than from more distant countries. Social media has opened up an area of influence on elections that was not there previously when limitations on spending were designed. The right may be better equiped than the left to take advatnage. This is not to say that the Chinese, Saudis and the Russians would not, particularly out of anger for various statements from the Trudeau government, be interested in the next election here as well. I think the emphasis on the outside which is a real but reduced threat has been backwards and this, to the extent that the threat is less credible, has minimized the argument that greater security over the election needs to take place. It is also coming at a time of reduced capacity for the NDP financially.