A recent report from the Center on International Cooperation examines the use of private security companies and tribal militias by occupying forces in Afghanistan — a practice the report shows is illegal under Afghan law. This of course strikes one as important news, yet only the Guardian of Britain chose to notify their readers of the findings. Since the CIC boasts Afghanistan expert Barnett Rubin as its leading light, one cannot chalk it up to being unqualified or dodgy. One suspects that news editors felt instead that this was the “wrong story,” and filled their papers with more musings about the right strategy for the war. A new strategy is widely anticipated, though it seems to be shaping up to be simply a continuation of the same thing, only more of it.

Here’s the Guardian’s coverage of the report:

Nato forces rely on illegal Afghan militias, report says
Julian Borger – The Guardian
16 September

Nato forces in Afghanistan are increasingly reliant on illegal militias, often run by warlords responsible for human rights abuses and drug trafficking, according to an independent report published tomorrow.

New York University’s Centre on International Co-operation (CIC) reports that the use of private security companies and militias is growing exponentially and accounts for up to a fifth of the funds spent on Afghan reconstruction.

The CIC report, called The Public Cost of Private Security in Afghanistan, says many of the troop contingents in Nato’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) use private militias not only to guard their camps and secure convoys, but also for “black ops”, including detention and interrogation.

The militias function entirely outside Afghan law, which bans unlicensed armed groups, nor is there any legal basis for their employment in the “status of forces agreement” with the Kabul government, the CIC says in its report… (link)

And for fans of “In-A-Gadda-Da-Vida,” here are some excerpts of the CIC report:

Militia groups employed by foreign military forces pose an even greater regulatory challenge than private security companies (PSCs) and do more long-term harm to stabilization efforts in Afghanistan. Although there is a well-defined legal framework outlawing militia and paramilitary groups, it is unclear whether these laws apply to the “armed support groups” (ASGs) used by foreign forces. Nonetheless, these forces are prima facie violations of Presidential Decree 50 on demobilization and disarmament, the Law on Firearms, Ammunition, and Explosives, the “Procedure for Regulating Activities of Private Security Companies in Afghanistan” and the “Strategy for Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups in Afghanistan”…

Use of private security by the US in combat zones has grown despite congressional legislation and guidance stating that PSCs cannot undertake “inherently governmental functions.” … Contractors comprised 57 percent of the DoD’s workforce in Afghanistan in March 2009 – the highest percentage ever used by the US in any conflict…

Senior Afghan government officials and their relatives “up to the second degree” are banned from ownership or part ownership [of PSCs]. However, holding companies and other means are used to obscure the true ownership of PSCs; close relatives of senior officials – including President Karzai and Defense Minister Abdul Rahim Wardak – are previously documented owners and partners in companies, but often have removed their names from licensing documents despite indications of continued ownership, though not day-to-day management…

Despite public concerns of criminal behavior by some PSCs in Afghanistan, there is no formal complaint mechanism…

While ISAF and US contingents employ licensed security companies in some locations, the use of unregistered companies and illegal armed support groups, with little oversight or accountability, appears to be widespread among international military forces.

Sources estimate that there are also as many as 1,000 to 1,500 illegal ASGs that have been employed, trained, and armed by ISAF and Coalition Forces to provide security to forward operating bases, escort supply convoys, and perform other functions, as well as by development agency contractors and provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) to protect assistance projects…

In Kandahar province, the Canadian Forces have contracted defense services from Gul Agha Shirzai (via Commando Security) and Gen. Gulalai, both former military commanders. Shirzai, currently governor of Nangarhar province, was previously governor of Kandahar. The Canadian PRT has hired the militia of Col. Haji Toorjan, an ally of Sherzai, to provide camp security services…

The mandate of the Coalition Forces and ISAF is to support the Afghan government and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). However, by employing ASGs, the international community strengthens PSP power relative to Afghan government institutions…

PSPs, especially unlicensed security companies and ASGs, are dependent on short-term contracts with foreign entities and have no prospect of sustainability. Hence, when the foreign entities eventually leave or terminate their contracts, these PSPs are likely to refocus on illegal economic activities and will fight among themselves for market share – better trained and better armed than before.

PSPs are generally the most lucrative option available to former combatants that have either been excluded from – or failed by – the international community’s disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration initiatives… (link)

Dave Markland

Dave Markland

Dave Markland lives in Vancouver where he organizes with Stopwar.ca and regularly blogs for rabble.ca.