CIMG0562

“The U.S. blocked diplomatic moves (from the Arab States, Europe, the PLO) because it refused to accept this kind of diplomatic settlement. Well, there’s a name for that in the United States, It’s called the Peace Process. What it actually is, is the process by which the United States prevents peace.” – Dr. Noam Chomsky

 

After over three months of calm on Israel’s frontier with the besieged Gaza Strip, the Israeli forces have again resorted to military incursions. The question is: why now?

To shed light on this question, we must look closely and critically at the events of the past few years, with particular attention to Israeli strategy toward Hamas.


Boycotting Hamas, besieging Gaza

Let’s begin with Hamas’ electoral victory in the 2006 national elections, a victory that surprised Israel and the United States, given expectations that Fatah would hold on to its historical ruling position.

Caught off guard and faced with intense pressure from the U.S. and Israel, many Western governments acted quickly to boycott Hamas and deprive it of aid it otherwise would have received. Israel in turn withheld customs money and tightened border terminals to goods and people.

For the boycotts and closures to be lifted, Hamas, you may recall, was asked to unconditionally accept three preconditions laid out by the Quartet: (a) recognition of Israel’s right to exist; (b) recognition of all prior agreements between Israel and the PLO/PA; and (c) a renunciation of violence. But Hamas refused to concede and recognize the first precondition.

In an interview with the Washington Post, Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh explained his party’s decision: “Which Israel should we recognize? The Israel of 1917; the Israel of 1936; the Israel of 1948; the Israel of 1956; or the Israel of 1967? Which borders and which Israel? Israel has to recognize first the Palestinian state and its borders and then we will know what we are talking about.”


Fatah vs. Hamas

Later in 2006, conflict began to erupt between Fatah and Hamas, in particular because some members of Fatah, having had access to power and resources through the Palestinian Authority (PA) until Hamas’ victory at the polls, were unwilling to accept their now subordinated role.

In an attempt to resolve the power struggle between Hamas and Fatah, and restore a cohesive Palestinian political power and voice against the Israeli occupation, Saudi Arabia’s King Abdallah brokered the “Mecca Agreement” in February 2007 and succeeded to form a Palestinian national unity government. But it would not last.

The Quartet and Israel claimed that this unity government still did not satisfy the preconditions, namely because Hamas continued to refuse an explicit recognition of Israel’s “right to exist.” So the international boycotts of the PA, the closures, and the internal power struggle continued.

By June 2007, nearly half of Hamas’ parliamentary bloc in the West Bank was in Israeli custody. Fatah members had become emboldened by U.S. and Israeli support, refusing to take orders, and even engaging in minor assaults on Hamas-run ministries and paramilitary premises. In response, Hamas launched a pre-emptive coup on June 10 in order to secure its remaining governmental base in Gaza.

In four days, Hamas managed to expel the Fatah militias under the leadership of National Security Advisor Mohammad Dahlan and to gain exclusive control of Gaza. This gave way to the development of two separate regimes: Hamas in Gaza and Fatah in the West Bank.


Not two states, but two Palestinian regimes

Under this new reality, Israel began to treat the West Bank and Gaza much differently. In the West Bank it eased some restrictions and opened up dialogue with the de facto Fatah government. In the Gaza Strip, Israel continued to isolate Hamas, putting the tiny caged-in coastal territory under a crippling siege.

Following a violent summer last year of tit-for-tat attacks between the Israeli military and Hamas, Israel proceeded to designate the Gaza Strip a “hostile territory” and to reduce Gaza’s supply of fuel and electricity, on which its 1.5 million residents are obviously dependent.

The Israeli administration declared that the “hostile territory” designation was simply intended as a factual description of what the Gaza Strip ostensibly is, and that the sanctions that accompanied it were intended as self-defense against Qassam rocket attacks launched against Israel.

More accurately, Israel intended this designation, new to the jargon-rich lexicon of international politics, as a way to sabotage the “peace process” ahead of the Annapolis Summit and to further split the Palestinians along political and territorial lines.

Divided, the Palestinians are of course much weaker and less able to pose any considerable challenge to Israeli dictates.

Another purpose of labelling Gaza a “hostile territory” was to turn it into the equivalent of a “rogue state,” open to attack and sanctions as never before. The logic is simple: Hamas is hostile, so anything goes-including collective punishment.

The effects of this designation were evident within a few months. Fatal Israeli military incursions into the Gaza Strip, electricity blackouts, and unnecessary deaths due to medicine and equipment shortages are just some of the devastating consequences that residents of Gaza have been forced to face.


Ceasefire?

Finally, on June 18, 2008, Hamas and Israel agreed to a five month long hudna, or ceasefire. Along with halting violent attacks, Israel also agreed to ease its blockade and allow a greater amount of goods to enter Gaza, hoping that this would lead to the release of captured Israeli Corporal Gilad Shalit.

Yet Israel’s siege remained crippling and Shalit was not released. True, there were no violent attacks, but Israel’s collective punishment against the Palestinian residents of Gaza continued practically unabated.

Fast forward to November 4.


Renewed fighting

With the world distracted by the U.S. presidential elections, the Israeli military launched a fatal attack on Gaza territory, killing six people.

Following Israel’s initial attacks, Hamas retaliated with periodic bouts of rocket fire, but no damage was reported. So far at least 16 Palestinians have been killed in Israeli attacks over the past few weeks.

Revealingly, Israel’s attacks come at a time when Fatah and Hamas are looking to reconcile their differences towards again forming some sort of unity government.

True, the Egyptian-brokered negotiations between Hamas and Fatah, scheduled to take place in Cairo on November 9, collapsed before they even began. But the fact that Israeli attacks took place just days prior to potentially groundbreaking reconciliation talks is suspicious, albeit unsurprising given the Israeli government’s usual tactics.

Speaking of which, Olmert has recently said that Hamas is responsible for “shattering” the ceasefire. How this makes any sense given that Israel initiated the violence is beyond reason, but sure enough, this line has managed to catch on in mainstream Israeli and international circles.

If we examine Israel’s strategic moves over recent years, it is evident that Israel does not want a Palestinian government of national unity to take shape, unless Hamas succumbs to each and every one of Israel’s dictates.

Hamas has already signalled that it’s ready to accept 1967 borders and a long-term truce, but apparently that’s not enough.

Rather, the Israeli government prefers a “hostile” Gaza and a divided Palestine. That way, it can continue to do what it wants without any serious challenges from the Palestinians or the international community.