A photo of a parade float featuring the likeness of populist Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro.
A parade float featuring the likeness of populist Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro. Credit: Matheus Câmara da Silva / Unsplash Credit: Matheus Câmara da Silva / Unsplash

Some commentators have argued that populism is its own worst enemy. So will populism self-destruct? Populism is not like other movements such as the anti-globalization movement of the late 1990s or Occupy Wall Street in 2011 that fell apart after an intense, short-lived presence on the global stage. 

Authoritarian populism is radically different because it has been electorally successful. Far from being a protest movement on the edges of power, authoritarian populism is now a threat from inside the liberal democratic order, with high-profile leaders, money, and a broad electoral base.

Political scientists like ourselves don’t have a crystal ball, but we need to think about how populism ends. Will it remake the system in its own image, or will it implode under the weight of its own contradictions? 

David Frum has recently argued in the Atlantic that overturning Roe v. Wade is triggering a backlash by the majority of Americans who don’t oppose abortion with the same zeal as the hard core of church-led crusaders. Just like alcohol prohibition in the 1920s, the criminalization of abortion will create new forms of resistance as the practice is driven underground. 

In our new book Has Populism Won? The War On Liberal Democracy, we argue that nobody can count on populism to exhaust its nuclear fuel, like a dying star, for one very important reason. In an era of rampant inequality and ubiquitous social media, populism’s fuel will never run out. For every populist politician who falls off the big stage, there is another that is another waiting in the wings. So what is our likely future? Here are two scenarios to help us think strategically about the next phase of the political cycle. 

The first is the most desirable end to populism, but it is also the least realistic. In this optimistic scenario, the radical right faces a growing crisis of legitimacy over the most basic questions about rights and freedoms. In this scenario the populists are driven from power by a broad countervailing coalition of citizens. 

The opposition in Hungary recently tried this outreach strategy unsuccessfully and failed spectacularly. In an unfair election Orban won more than 60 per cent of the popular vote. Such a strategy would probably fail in the U.S. as well. It is not likely that anti-Trump Republicans would work with the Democrats to defeat populist candidates. 

If an electoral surge fails, might a surge of violence be the next logical step? Direct action in the form of protest or voting, may not be enough. Certainly, violence is always an option of last resort in the Anglo-American political tradition. It is surreal to write these words, but some sort of civil war could happen as Stephen Marche so powerfully imagines in his recent book. 

The second is the most pessimistic scenario, but it’s also the most realistic. The Trump populists win high office and corrupt the electoral system with unfair voting laws and a conservative Supreme Court running interference. Entrenched in the halls of power in state capitals and Washington, the MAGA movement continues to rewrite state and federal voting laws to exclude undesirable poor and Black voters. Their program of democracy destruction would be supported by ideologically aligned judges and bureaucrats. 

This sounds unlikely but it’s not. Trump’s movement has learned from its recent loss and is creating legislation that would allow the replacement of civil servants who are not sufficiently eager to carry out the movement’s desires. Even if Democrats were successful in stopping this full court press to politicize the civil service and roll back voting rights, it would take them a decade or more to topple the populist big men – one school board, county seat, and governorship at a time.

There is a third possibility in which voters grow disillusioned and gradually return to established parties. It’s possible that populism ends not with a bang but a whimper. 

We’ve already seen this happen in some countries where populists were slow to enact public health measures, and that cost them electorally. Certainly, the pandemic was a factor in Trump’s loss, but for most populists around the world it was only a temporary setback. 

The movement keeps on rolling forward, as we have seen with the Conservative Party’s choice of Liz Truss for Prime Minister in the UK, a candidate whose campaign promised more of the same ideologically rigid populist formula. After 44 days in office her resignation plunged the country into the greatest political and economic crisis since the invasion of Suez in 1956. 

In some places populism may fade away, but we should be careful not to put too much hope in a scenario where our problems are solved so easily. Earlier this year, when Russia invaded Ukraine, experts once more thought this crisis would torpedo the populist insurgency. Certainly, conservatives have turned against the Putin regime in record numbers. But pandemic, war, inflation, and an energy crisis has not destroyed populism in any country where it has already gained a foothold. 

In fact, emergencies give smart populists more fuel for grievance politics. Furthermore, instability provides an opportunity to keep liberals off-balance and turn up the violent rhetoric from the right. 

Has Populism Already Won?

There is not much that is hopeful in any of these scenarios. Can it be that the populists have already won? 

They can claim victory in round one; liberal democracy has taken a beating. No democracy is an island. But there is much more to come; this is going to be a defining fight of this century. 

The authoritarian right is emboldened with every repetition of the big lie. They have normalized a paranoid style of politics and repeatedly won elections despite their many crimes. Now that they’ve tasted victory, they’re going to be bigger, stronger, and tougher to beat. But we can and must beat them. For women, sexual minorities, immigrants, refugees, and those of us who care about the future of democracy, it will be a fight for our lives. 

Daniel Drache is Professor Emeritus of Politics at York University in Toronto. Marc D. Froese is Professor of Political Science at Burman University in western Canada. Their book is recently published, Has Populism Won? The War On Liberal Democracy, ECW press, Toronto, 2022.